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MFree Trade and Immigration
by Saskia Sassen
At the Bush administra-tion's insistence, theissue of immigration isexcluded from US-Mexi-can negotiations for afree-trade agreement.
The administration claims, how-
ever, that such an agreement will
stem illegal immigration from Mex-
ico. This claim raises several ques-
tions: Does international evidence
support this stance? More gen-
erally, is it viable to deregulate in-
vestment and trade flows while
keeping tight restrictions on labor
flows? And under what conditions
would a free-trade agreement re-
tain potential emigrants in Mexico
and prevent job losses and wage
cuts in the US?
Crossing Borders
North America is already a de facto
trade bloc, and Mexico's Border In-
dustrialization Program has estab-
lished a quasi free-investment zone
in that country's northern region.
In light of not only North Ameri-
can and European but now also
Japanese evidence, we cannot dis-
count the possibility that a free-
trade and investment bloc could
evolve into a regional free-labor
market.
To begin with, the considerable
growth of export-assembly industry
in northern Mexico over the last
two decades has not deterred the
migration of Mexicans to the US.
Saskia Sassen is professor of urban
planning at Columbia University and
a member of Hemisphere's editorial
advisory board. Her most recent book is
The Global City: New York London
Tokyo (Princeton University Press,
1991).
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Instead, the rapid expansion of the
maquila program has encouraged
new migrations from the interior
of the country to its northern bor-
der zone, which in turn serves as a
platform for crossing into the US.
On a broader scale, the maquila
program has consolidated a trans-
national border economy, within
which trade, investment, and peo-
ple move rather freely.
The same pattern characterizes
other countries with strong migra-
tion ties to the US. For example,
the enactment in 1965 of a new US
immigration law-aimed primarily
at the reunion of European fami-
lies-initiated the renewal of mass
immigration to the US after several
decades' absence. The law's enact-
ment took place in the context of
expanded US economic and mili-
tary activities in South and South-
east Asia and the Caribbean Basin,
where the US was the dominant
First World presence. Simulta-
neously the US government passed
legislation aimed at opening its
own economy and those of other
countries to the flow of capital,
goods, services, and information.
So, who were most of the new im-
migrants? Not Europeans but
rather people from South and
Southeast Asia and the Caribbean
Basin, who crossed the newly built
economic and military bridges into
the US.
Still another case involves Japan,
which has never been an immigra-
tion country. Reflecting its quest
to preserve racial homogeneity,
Japan's law on the entry and exit
of aliens does not even include the
concept of immigration. Strikingly,
then, Japan is now receiving a grow-
ing influx of illegal immigrants.
These immigrants are overwhelm-
ingly from leading Asian sites of
Japanese foreign investment,
trade, and aid: Bangladesh, Paki-
stan, Thailand, the Philippines,
and South Korea. Could it be that
Japan has unwittingly created chan-
nels for the flow of not only goods
and capital but also people?
These cases suggest that, when it
involves countries of unequal devel-
opment and unequal job oppor-
tunities, the forging of strong
economic and geopolitical rela-
tions promotes labor migration
from poorer to wealthier countries.
In the US case we have usually at-
tributed the renewal of large-scale
migrations to the immigration law
of 1965. The Japanese case, how-
ever, indicates that the establish-
ment of intense trade, investment,
and aid ties between unequal
partners fosters migration to the
wealthier country--even if the
latter's laws are unfavorable to im-
migration. The reasons are two-
fold. First, such ties serve as
channels for the international
movement of people. And second,
they enable potential emigrants to
familiarize themselves with the
country of destination.
How might this scenario un-
fold in the event of a US-Mexican
free-trade agreement? Such an
agreement could substantially
strengthen existing economic link-
ages and create new ones, from
cross-border personnel transfers to
the packaging and trucking of
goods made in Mexico (by either
US or Mexican firms) for the US
market. Such linkages would engen-
der new patterns of communica-
tion, work, and travel between the
two countries, strengthening the
many bridges between them. They
would also further integrate Mexi-
can workers into the US economy,
through employment in Mexico in
both US and Mexican firms geared
to the US market. Such patterns
could be expected to broaden and
intensify Mexican contact with US
popular and work cultures. To-
gether, these conditions could
spawn a generalized notion that
people are entitled to free move-
ment between the two countries.
We can therefore anticipate that a
free-trade pact would not diminish
the flow of Mexican workers to the
US. On the contrary, a free-trade
pact would probably further inte-
grate Mexican workers-including
undocumented workers-into the
US economy.
This picture returns us to the
question of whether the deregula-
tion of trade and investment but
not labor is a viable policy. The US
government has passed several laws
meant to regulate the number and
identity of immigrants. The results,
however, have been dubious. Thus,
the 1965 law, intended to attract
mainly Europeans, instead facili-
tated large-scale migrations from
Asia and the Caribbean Basin. And
the 1986 law, meant to stop illegal
immigration, has had the oppo-
site effect as illegal entries have
reached unprecedented levels. Ar-
guably, the limited success of these
and related laws stems from an in-
correct assumption of US policy-
makers: that immigration flows are
unrelated to other international
flows, such as those of trade, in-
vestment, and aid.
As long as Mexico lags far
behind the US in economic devel-
opment and employment opportu-
nities, a free-trade accord is likely
not to reduce but to increase Mexi-
can migration to the US. Rather
than be taken by surprise, policy-
makers should prepare for this
distinct possibility.
Uniform Standards
US and Mexican officials should
consider not only the benefits but
also the costs of a free-trade agree-
ment. For instance, considerable
evidence suggests that, by taking ad-
vantage of Mexico's cheap labor
and weak environmental regula-
tions, US firms not only would
cause job losses for US workers.
They would also create added pres-
sures on many firms in the US to
lower wages, sidestep regulations
on work-place standards, and hire
undocumented immigrants. Fur-
ther, the relocation of US firms
under these conditions would not
promote economic development in
Mexico: by neither upgrading jobs
nor increasing wages, it would fail
to raise the consumption capacity
of Mexican households and firms,
and thus would fail to generate
local economic linkages.
What policies could moder-
ate these costs? A key approach
would be to implement uniform
work-place standards-from mini-
mum wages to toxic emission
levels.
Not only would major firms oper-
ating in Mexico retain their com-
petitive advantage of substantially
lower overall production costs. In
addition, improved employment
conditions and minimum wages
would lead more Mexican workers
to remain in Mexico instead of mi-
grating to the US. What is more,
the consequent boost to economic
demand within Mexico would fos-
ter expanded consumption by the
country's households and busi-
nesses, thereby increasing the sales-
based profits of foreign firms in the
Mexican market. Finally, a greater
effort at enforcement of uniform
standards in the US would reduce
the competitive advantage of Mexi-
can illegal immigrants-i.e., their
willingness to work at below mini-
mum wages and standards. This
result would protect jobs for US
workers, whether US born or not,
while further dissuading illegal
migration.
By raising the prospect of a
free-trade pact, US and Mexican
policymakers are breaking sharply
with tradition. In so doing they are
creating a platform for an even
more profound break with tradi-
tion: the reorientation of US-Mexi-
can relations towards reasonable
wages and decent employment con-
ditions. Aiming at authentic, sus-
tainable development in Mexico,
rather than super profits through
cheap labor and environmental
degradation, should be an over-
arching goal of US as well as Mexi-
can negotiators of a free-trade
agreement. .
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Commentary
An Informal Path to Development?
by Alejandro Portes
n a much celebrated book,
The Other Path (1987), Peru-
vian economist Hernando de
Soto argues that the informal,
or legally unregulated, econ-
omy offers a magical solution
to Latin America's deeply rooted
problem of underdevelopment.
According to De Soto, the entre-
preneurial energies of Latin Ameri-
ca's common people are constantly
blocked by an overgrown and inef-
ficient state-the heritage of the
Spanish mercantilist tradition-
which sucks vast resources from the
economy and contributes little in
return. Popular enterprise drowns
in a mass of red tape, as arcane
regulations and greedy govern-
ment officials make it too difficult
for people to try to implement in-
novative ideas.
De Soto's Path
In De Soto's opinion, informal en-
terprise is not simply a means of
popular survival; it is also the vehi-
cle through which market forces
reassert themselves despite the dis-
tortions created by government
over-regulation. Following this
logic, the growth of the informal
economy throughout Latin Amer-
ica during the 1980s must not be
deplored as a sign of deepening
Alejandro Portes is professor of sociology
and international relations at the Johns
Hopkins University, and Patricia and
Philip Frost Visiting Professor atFlor-
ida International University. He is a
member of Hemisphere 's editorial
advisory board. Portes is co-author
(with Ruben Rumbaut) of Immigrant
America: A Portrait (University of
California Press, 1990).
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crisis, but celebrated as a symptom
of the final breakdown of the mer-
cantilist state. De Soto claims that
removing the bureaucratic hand-
cuffs from common people will un-
leash their energies and ingenuity,
thereby giving a powerful impulse
to economic development. What
could be easier?
Like all simple recipes to resolve
the woes of poor nations, this for-
mula has elements of truth. Re-
search among Latin America's
peasantry and urban "marginal"
population has consistently docu-
mented the entrepreneurial abil-
ities of these groups and their
remarkable capacity to survive
under difficult economic condi-
tions. In so portraying these seg-
ments of the population, De Soto
merely appropriates common
knowledge, long established and
accepted by students of poverty in
the region. Nor is there much new
in the indictment of red tape and
state inefficiency. That govern-
ment agencies and officials in
Latin America have often acted as
predators rather than protectors of
civil society is a well-known fact es-
tablished by historical and socio-
logical studies of the region and
consecrated in a prominent novelis-
tic tradition. Studies of urban infor-
mal enterprises during the 1960s
and '70s also show that among the
obstacles to their success was the
greed of petty officials, the impun-
ity with which they preyed on hum-
ble vendors and producers, and
the periodic raids ordered by
higher-ups in the name of reestab-
lishing "order" in public spaces.
Again, The Other Path does little but
appropriate and reassert what was
already well-known.
De Soto uses these elements of
truth, however, to make plausible a
remarkable conclusion: that the
so far repressed entrepreneurial
spirit of the poor is a key to Latin
America's future development.
Deprived of its novel neopopulist
garb, the message is little more
than the long familiar "magic-of-
the-marketplace" doctrine. Elimi-
nate state interference, it is said,
and the "invisible hand" will take
care of generating productivity,
entrepreneurship, and economic
growth. This free-market argument
has been partially discredited by its
association with the interests of the
wealthy, but De Soto's celebration
of the grassroots entrepreneur
gives his message a far more appeal-
ing veneer. This political quality of
The Other Path largely explains its
enthusiastic embrace by the IMF,
the World Bank, and USAID offi-
cials, who had previously con-
fronted enormous difficulties in
selling laissez-faire policies to Latin
American and other Third World
governments. Thanks to the sup-
port of these agencies, De Soto was
catapulted into international prom-
inence as an articulate defender of
the market in the name of the
poor.
Obstacles in the Path
Unfortunately the model does not
work. The difficulties are obvious
upon realizing that De Soto's pro-
posal is simply to let popular eco-
nomic initiatives-often created as
an alternative to destitution-com-
pete in an open and "level" market
field. Devoid of external support,
most micro-entrepreneurs lack the
capital, the technological know-
how, and the market information
to do so successfully. Many of these
popular enterprises have managed
to survive by taking advantage of
state regulation of large formal
firms. By avoiding the inflexibility
and cost associated with such regu-
lation, the smaller entrepreneurs
partially compensate for their dis-
advantages in capitalization and
technology. By removing state
protection of formal workers and
other current regulations, De
Soto's program would certainly
make large corporations more
agile and competitive. Ironically,
though, such action would do little
for, or even reduce the competitive-
ness of, the informal entrepre-
neurs in whose name the program
is being implemented. Herein lies
the appeal of The Other Path. The
program would consolidate the
hegemony of large firms by elimi-
nating costs incurred for the pro-
tection of workers; that is, the
capitalist firms would gain at the
expense of the workers and small
enterprises on whose behalf the
program is advocated. In the ab-
sence of the marginal advantage
created by the legal protection of
workers, small enterprises would
lose their competitive terrain.
The economic potential of the
informal economy is not limited to
its role as a means of subsistence
for the poor. Nevertheless, in every
case where informal enterprises
have succeeded in transcending
that level, the achievement was
preceded by events that limited
rather than "freed" the play of mar-
ket forces. For example, the much
celebrated experience of central
Italy, where small industrial enter-
prises have achieved striking pros-
perity, is cemented on the basis of
class solidarity among independent
artisans, which constrains their in-
ternal competition, and on active
support and assistance by the re-
gional government.
The same elements are found
in those instances documented by
empirical research where small arti-
sans and vendors have coalesced
into an "informal economy of
growth." The first of these is extra-
economic solidarity among the
firms based on a common ethnicity
or history, which encourages coop-
erative links instead of market com-
petition among the firms. The
second is the provision of subsi-
dized credit, training, and market-
ing assistance to the fledgling firms
by local government authorities.
The transformation of grassroots
enterprises from means of survival
to vehicles of self-sustained growth
has hitherto depended not on re-
moving the state from the market.
Instead it has depended on con-
trolling the market's atomizing
effects among small producers,
including the encouragement of
state involvement in focused and ef-
ficient ways.
The experiences of central Italy,
Hong Kong, and several ethnic en-
claves in US and Latin American
cities indicate that there is indeed
"another path" for economic
growth rooted in popular entrepre-
neurship. Yet each such experience
negates De Soto's model because
the underlying social processes are
exactly the opposite of those advo-
cated by free-market ideology and
the international agencies under
its spell. Laissez-faire policies may
well stimulate large-scale capital
investments and the expansion of
multinational corporations, but to
build a "leg" for economic develop-
ment based on the entrepreneurial
initiatives of common people calls
for a very different set of policies. .
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Abortion Politics in Nicaragua
by Martha L Morgan
abortion may be the gal-
vanizing force of Latin
American feminism in
the decade ahead. Pro-
posals in 1990 to liberalize
criminal restrictions on abortion
sparked heated debate in Argenti-
na, Colombia, and Peru. Mean-
while the legislature of the
Mexican state of Chiapas modi-
fied its criminal code to broaden
the availability of legal abortions,
a measure that generated so much
controversy that it was suspended
pending an opinion from the Comi-
si6n Nacional deDerechos Humanos.
Latin America is certainly ripe
for abortion law reform. Mexican
psychotherapist Sylvia Marcos esti-
mates that--driven by poverty and
desperation-Latin American
women undergo some 12 million
abortions each year. Indeed, the
health complications of illegal abor-
tions are thought to be the leading
cause of death among Latin Ameri-
can women between the ages of 15
and 39. Estimates of the mid-1980s
share of maternal deaths due to
illegal or clandestine abortions for
selected countries are revealing: Ar-
gentina, 35%; Chile, 36%; Colom-
bia, 29%; and Costa Rica, 30%.
In Nicaragua the debate over
the decriminalization of abortion
first erupted during the mid-1980s
under the Sandinistas. Yet, even
though its current president, Vio-
leta Barrios de Chamorro, is Latin
Martha I. Morgan is professor of consti-
tutional law at the University ofAla-
bama. She is the author of "Founding
Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories in
the 1987 Nicaraguan Constitution,"
Boston University Law Review
(1990).
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America's only female head of
state, Nicaragua now seems to rank
among the least likely of Latin
American countries to tackle the
matter of abortion law reform.
Sandinista Policy
In 1985 a report in the Sandinista
newspaper Barricada on a study by
doctors at Managua's Bertha Calde-
r6n Hospital-the only hospital in
Nicaragua that serves exclusively
women-drew public attention to
the gravity of the country's prob-
lems with illegal abortions. The two-
year study focused on the plight of
the vast majority of women who, un-
like the privileged minority, do not
have access to safe, if illegal, abor-
tions. It reported that 45% of the
hospital's admissions consisted of
women suffering from the effects
of illegal abortions. A later study
showed that complications from
illegal abortions were Nicaragua's
leading cause of maternal deaths,
rising from 33% in 1980 to 53% in
1985.
Not until 1989, however, did the
Ministerio de Salud officially recog-
nize illegal abortions as the princi-
pal cause of maternal deaths. In
the meantime, demands for the
decriminalization of abortion sur-
faced both during and after the
adoption of the 1987 constitution.
Yet the Sandinista government con-
tinually side-stepped the abortion
issue, thus avoiding confrontation
with the leadership of Nicaragua's
Catholic Church. Sex education
and access to contraceptives-two
other components of the assertion
of women's "right to motherhood
freely chosen"'-found readier ac-
ceptance under the Sandinistas.
War and economic crisis, however,
limited the success of programs in
these spheres.
Given the unwillingness of the
Sandinistas to support the repeal
of the criminal code's prohibitions
on abortion, health-care profession-
als took initiative themselves to al-
leviate the law's harsh impact. At
Bertha Calder6n Hospital they
began to emphasize emergency
treatment for women with compli-
cations from illegal abortions,
thereby reducing the number of
deaths. A related effort focused on
the penal code's exceptions to
criminal liability for "therapeutic"
abortions (if approved by three hos-
pital committee members and con-
sented to by the woman's husband
or a parent). 'Therapeutic" is not
defined in the code, but it had
been traditionally interpreted in
the narrow sense as referring only
to abortions medically necessary
to save a woman's life.
The committee in charge of ap-
proving requests for therapeutic
abortions at Bertha Calder6n Hos-
pital was restructured during the
Sandinista years. This restructuring
began in 1986 in response to a case
in which the mother of a 14-year-
old, mentally retarded paraplegic
victim of alleged incest requested
such an abortion for her daughter,
only to have the all-male commit-
tee meet five times without reach-
ing a conclusion. Eventually the
committee acceded to the de-
mands of the hospital's employees
that the abortion be authorized.
The committee, however, resigned,
and was replaced by a committee
of three women doctors. The new
committee and the Ministerio de
Salud broadened the interpretation
of "therapeutic" to include cases
such as incest and rape reported to
the police, as well as proven failure
of contraceptive method.
Under the revised interpre-
tation, the approval rate for thera-
peutic abortions rose markedly.
Defending this approach, one
woman remarked: "An unwanted
pregnancy is a pathology, an ill-
ness. It's a risk to have an un-
wanted pregnancy, and we can
demonstrate that with the women
who've died or who've stuck metal
rods within themselves after having
passed before committees that told
them no."
Chamorro's Policy
Clearly, reform of the 1974 Nicara-
guan Penal Code's criminalization
of all but therapeutic abortions
would have been uncertain even if
the Sandinistas had defeated Cha-
morro in the presidential election
of February 1990. The Chamorro
government, however, has been
openly allied with Nicaraguan cardi-
nal Miguel Obando y Bravo. Given
reports of its close ties with leading
charismatic Catholics as well, it is
no surprise the government has
been aligning its policy with main-
stream Catholic teachings on con-
traceptives and abortion.
For instance, the Ministerio de
Educaci6n has reportedly banned
the explicit sex education materials
previously used in some schools.
Education minister Humberto Belli
argues that schools should rein-
force "Christian values," including
the view that "sex is the door to pro-
creation." Health minister Ernesto
Salmer6n has been somewhat
more flexible regarding sex educa-
tion, allowing his ministry's involve-
ment in family planning and AIDS
education. Yet Salmer6n's flexibil-
S
ity does not extend to abortion.
Measures implemented under his
administration at Bertha Calder6n
Hospital have blocked access to
what had become a source of safe
and legal abortions for a growing
number of women. These mea-
sures include revised guidelines on
therapeutic abortions as well as
another round of changes in the
membership of the committee that
rules on such abortions. The new
committee, which consists of one
female and two male doctors, is ad-
hering to an extremely narrow defi-
nition of "therapeutic."
Struggling to stabilize the impov-
erished and strife-ridden country,
President Chamorro herself has
reportedly had little direct involve-
ment in the abortion controversy.
Still, in a 1987 interview presented
in Denis Lynn Daly Heyck's Life
Stories of the Nicaraguan Revolution
(1990), Chamorro revealed that
doctors once advised her against
continuing a pregnancy because of
a negative RH factor. "But since
Pedro [Chamorro] and his family
were so Catholic," she recounted,
"an abortion was out of the ques-
tion. We went to talk with represen-
tatives of the Church, to priests
and so forth, but the outcome was
that the child would be born come
what may. ... That's life; one has
to have faith in God, that's the only
way." The child, whom Chamorro
referred to as her "little angel,"
died a few hours after birth.
Apart from Chamorro's per-
sonal views about abortion, her
government's close alignment with
Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and
Nicaragua's continuing challenges
of economic underdevelopment
and political conflict, make highly
unlikely the liberalization of abor-
tion laws during her presidency. *
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Reports: Politics of Birth
Birth-Control Politics in Peru
by Sam Dillon
President Alberto Fujimorihas committed Peru toone of Latin America'smost ambitious family-planning programs, built
around free distribution
of contraceptives in thousands of
government health facilities-all in
aggressive defiance of the country's
Roman Catholic bishops. The ac-
tion amounts to the most dramatic
reversal of any Latin American
country's population policy since
Mexican president Luis Echeverria
launched a sweeping national
family-planning program in 1972.
Fujimori's actions have proved pop-
ular, leaving the bishops more iso-
lated in their views than at any
point in recent memory. "We're be-
ginning a new era," said Dr. Miguel
Ramos, 69, the gynecologist who
pioneered family planning in Peru
and today heads the Institute for
Responsible Parenthood.
For decades, birth control had
been a bad word in Peru, a suspi-
cious activity forced virtually under-
ground by hostile governments
acting in deference to Catholic
authorities. In 1974 police seized
Peru's only family-planning clinic
and jailed its director on morals
charges. As a result, demographers
have considered the country's pop-
ulation policies to be among the
hemisphere's most backward, with
hundreds of thousands of women
bearing children they don't want
and are too poor to feed. '
Shantytowns Grow
Peru's developing population crisis
was already evident in the 1960s,
Sam Dillon is a Latin America corre-
spondent for the Miami Herald.
8 Hemisphere. Winter/Spring 1991
when thousands of peasants fleeing
the highlands surrounded Limna
with shantytowns. But General
Juan Velasco, then Peru's military
leader, believed birth control to be
an imperialist plot to suppress the
Third World. He jailed Ramos for a
week in 1974 and confiscated his
private birth-control counseling
clinic.
In the years since, the principal
opposition to family planning
shifted to the bishops, Ramos said.
Fujimori's two immediate predeces-
sors, Fernando Belainde and Aln
Garcia, both initiated timid family-
planning programs, only to with-
draw support in the face of outcries
from the bishops.
Fujimori's support for popu-
lation control seems to have devel-
oped from his awareness-as the
rector of the Universidad Agraria del
Pern---of the problems stemming
from Peru's limited arable land. At
just one-third of an acre per per-
son, it is the lowest of any Latin
American nation. In 1988 Fujimori
hosted a televised debate on popu-
lation issues that increased his fa-
miliarity with the statistics of Peru's
crisis.
Fewer women use contraceptives
in Peru than in almost any other
Latin American country, just 23%,
according to the Ministerio de Salud.
Thlat has meant that although opin-
ion polls show that the average
Peruvian woman wants just 2.7 chil-
dren, she bears 3.7. In the Andes
Mountains, the average peasant
woman bears 6.3 children.
150,000 Abortions
As a consequence, nearly one in
every five pregnancies ends in il-
legal abortion--150,000 per year.
Every 43 hours, a woman bleeds to
death from abortion complica-
tions. The Ministerio de Salud
spends more money on blood
and surgery to repair the damage
from botched abortions than for
healthy childbirth.
Fujimori did not mention his
strong views on these topics as a
presidential candidate. But Carlos
Aramburu, the president of Fuji-
mori's Consejo Nacional de Poblacidn,
recalled in an interview that days
after Fujimori'sJune 1990 election
he ordered advisers to develop a na-
tional program for "efficient family
planning."
Aramburu and others developed
the plan that in 1991 will triple the
number of condoms and intra-
uterine devices and quintuple the
birth-control pills distributed in
government health facilities. Ex-
panding government services over
the next decade should bring con-
traceptives to about half of Peru's
women by the turn of the century,
said Dr. Jorge Parra, the health
ministry official administering the
program.
The plan is ambitious, but
even more striking were the force-
ful terms in which Fujimori an-
nounced it in a speech on October
23, 1990, and defended it against
Catholic attacks over the following
weeks, said David Tejada, Peru's
deputy health minister. "Because
of church opposition, the Peruvian
state has always been afraid to have
a clear population policy," Tejada
said. "But Fujimori made clear
from the beginning he had no fear
of the church."
Quiet Resentment
Fujimori, himself a Catholic, had
been nursing a quiet resentment
ever since an incident during the
presidential campaign: Lima's arch-
bishop, Augusto Vargas Alzamora,
reacted to Fujimori's popularity
among Peru's evangelical Protes-
tants by rescheduling a series of
outdoor religious processions from
October to May 1990 in a thinly dis-
guised effort on behalf of Fuji-
mori's opponent. Understanding
the widespread, quiet frustration
with the Church's opposition to
birth control in a nation that is
95% Catholic, Fujimori picked an
issue on which the bishops were
extremely vulnerable. And he ap-
peared to relish his confrontation
with them when it came.
Three days after he announced
the program, the bishops' con-
ference denounced Fujimori's
program, reiterating Church oppo-
sition to all birth control except ab-
stinence and the rhythm method,
and insinuating that Fujimori had
buckled under to pressures for pop-
ulation control from the developed
world. Fujimori shot right back, ac-
cusing unnamed Catholics of "recal-
citrant opposition" and "medieval
thinking" about birth control.
"There is nothing terrible about
not wanting children to eat gar-
bage in the streets," Fujimori said.
Trading Barbs
The president and the clerics
traded hostilities for nearly three
weeks. In one television interview,
Fujimori scoffed at the bishops' in-
sistence on "natural" birth-control
methods as unrealistic. "Why act
with fear?" Fujimori said, smiling at
the cameras. Finally, the bishops ap-
peared to throw in the towel when
Vargas Alzamora pleaded with re-
porters to stop airing the issue. "In
the end, the government will do
whatever it wants," he said.
A foreign priest who has worked
in Peru for more than 20 years said
the bishops, following the Vatican's
hard-line dictates on the issue, had
isolated themselves even from the
country's more than 3,200 priests
and nuns. 'The clergy is very un-
comfortable with the bishops' re-
cent statements," the priest said.
"People are saying, 'Monsignor
Alzamora, please shut your
mouth.'" a
Editor's Note: Adapted with permission
from an article published in the Miami
Herald (December 2, 1990).
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The Noriega Years
U.S.-Panamanian Relations, 1981-1990
MARGARET E. SCRANTON
Explains why the U.S. for so long adopted a "live and let live" policy
toward Panama, the reasons for the repeated failure of U.S. attempts
to remove Noriega from power, and the changes that led finally to a
decision in Washington to place the military option on the table.
1991 * hc/$25
Places of Origin
The Repopulation of Rural El Salvador
BEATRICE EDWARDS and GRETTA TOVAR
SIEBENTRITT
A detailed account of the collective return of refugees and displaced
persons to the villages they once fled in war-torn El Salvador.
1991 * hc/S25
Lynne Rienner Publishers
1800 30th Street * Boulder, Colorado 80301 * (303) 444-6684
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Reports: Politics of Birth
Debt Crisis, Birth Crisis
by Linda M. Whiteford
Sree health care is, inprinciple, a state-providedservice to the citizens of
the Dominican Republic.
During the 1960s and
1970s the government
made steady improvements in its
health care delivery system; be-
tween 1950 and 1970 the national
infant mortality rate dropped from
150 to 73 deaths per 1,000 live
births. The economic crisis of the
last decade, however, bankrupted
the public health system and re-
versed such progress.
Sugar exports, the traditional
mainstay of the Dominican econ-
omy, fell drastically when the US
slashed its sugar quota during the
mid-1980s by 33%. Combined with
the worldwide depression in sugar
prices, the reduction of US pur-
chases cut the Dominican Re-
public's sugar-export earnings by
27%. The government spent 70%
of its shrinking export revenue on
a swelling foreign debt.
In the meantime real wages
plunged as prices for basic com-
modities rose and food subsidies
were removed. In 1988 Dominicans
rioted in response to the austerity
cuts demanded by international
agencies as part of a debt restruc-
turing agreement. In particular,
workers in the transportation
unions struck to protest wage and
price controls, while physicians
Linda M. Whiteford is associate profes-
sor of anthropology and director of the
Medical Anthropology Program at the
University of South Florida. She is the
co-author (with Marilyn Poland) of
New Approaches to Human Repro-
duction: Social and Ethical Dimen-
sions (Westview Press, 1989).
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struck against their own low wages
and poor working conditions.
In this context the Dominican
state's capital expenditure on
health slumped to well below its
1970 level. Thus the public health-
care system was weakened by poor-
ly maintained facilities, a lack of
equipment, and a shortage of medi-
cines. Formally speaking, access to
health care remains free. Patients,
however, are required to provide
their own bed linens and medi-
cines. Furthermore, women who
plan to deliver their babies at pub-
lic hospitals are told to buy what-
ever supplies they need at the local
pharmacy and to bring those sup-
plies to the hospital with them.
These include the xylocaine, pito-
cin, and sterile gloves commonly
used during labor and delivery.
Immediately after delivery, women
and their newborn infants are
wheeled into a recovery room and
placed in a bed where they remain
for the following 12 to 24 hours
until they are discharged. Often
they share the bed with another
woman and her infant. Frequently
neither woman can supply a sheet
or pillow, so they lie feet-to-head
on plastic mattresses. And more
often than not, there is no running
water with which to wash, forcing
women to spend their recovery
time lying in their own blood.
While labor and delivery are dan-
gerous, inadequate and nonexis-
tent postpartum care contribute to
rising mortality rates. For instance,
in the mid-1980s 50% of women
who gave birth in Dominican pub-
lic health facilities had no prenatal
care. Of the remaining 50% two-
thirds of them had no prenatal
care until the second or third tri-
mester of their pregnancies. Mean-
while, fewer than 3% of total births
receive any postpartum care. As a
consequence of poor nutrition,
large numbers of Dominican
women begin labor with moderate
or severe anemia, increasing the
likelihood of hemorrhage and in-
fection. More than half of maternal
deaths are due to postpartum infec-
tions commonly associated with
Cesarean sections performed in un-
hygienic conditions.
Among newborns, almost one-
third of deaths are due to causes
that could be prevented by ade-
quate labor and postpartum care.
The most common cause of new-
born death is "unclassified anoxic
infections," a result of poor medi-
cal care during labor, delivery, and
postpartum. Adequate care during
these high-risk periods would also
prevent infections of the fetus and
newborn, the second most fre-
quent cause of perinatal mortality.
The economic crisis in the
Dominican Republic has turned
the country's public health system
into a mockery of its aims: the pro-
vision of free and adequate health
care. As a result, the population's
freedom from "fee-for-service" med-
ical care has exacted the cruel cost
of suffering and death among in-
fants and mothers. *
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Jamaican Sayings Cloth $22.95
With Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson
"A rich and compelling collection that will make a signif-
icant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/
black folklore and culture."-Daryl Cumber Dance,
Virginia Commonwealth University
Florida A & M University Press
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95
Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss
'The combination of folklore, oral history, and photo-
graphs makes this a work of interest to general readers and
scholars alike."-Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press
April 160 pp. 8 1/2 X 11 Paper $24.95
Amphibians and Reptiles
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson
"A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. "
-George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press
May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth $75.00
New from University Presses of Florida
U.S. Policy in Central America
The Endless Debate
Dario Moreno
"An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central
American policies under the Carter and Reagan admin-
istrations that exposes the roles played by competing
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shap-
ing two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. for-
eign policy."-Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute
Florida International University Press
Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95
Central America and the Middle East
The Internationalization of the Crises
Edited by Damidn J. Fernindez
'This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimen-
sion of the current crisis and goes far to explain why
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve."
-G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press
Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95
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of Christopher Columbus 4
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Translation and commentary by
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"Perhaps the most important
single volume on Columbus ever
published in English.... The
uthors' classification of Columbus's
ty as 'evangelical' will be contro-
ial, but is exactly right. He was as
aopolitan in his piety as in his
ography."-Leonard Sweet,
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May 288 pp. 8 1/2 x 11 Cloth $49.95
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Reports: Caribbean Art
A Headless Culture?
by Michele Baj Strobel
hy are contempo-
rary artists in the
French Antilles so
little known com-
pared to their col-
leagues elsewhere
in the Caribbean? There is a virtual
absence of an art market in Marti-
nique and Guadeloupe. As over-
seas departments of France, the
two islands are marginalized by
their geographical distance from
the metropolis. At the same time,
their special relationship with
Europe has hampered integration
into the Caribbean and the crea-
tion of ties with regional neighbors.
In contrast to other Caribbean
societies, the French Antilles mani-
fest a remarkable paucity of popu-
lar plastic art. The earliest attempts
at creolizing Antillean art that we
know of were based on mimicry of
European forms with local adapta-
tions. After World War II, however,
various articles published in the
journal Tropiques, under the editor-
ship of Aim C6saire, signaled the
beginnings of change. Questions
of identity began to emerge that
would mold the character of a
burgeoning creole creativity. The
Ecole des Arts Appliques was estab-
lished in 1945; together with the
Atelier 45, which brought together a
group of Martiniquan painters, this
represented a first effort to stake
out the island's identity through
painting. Nevertheless, the great
majority of pieces were not funda-
mentally distinguishable from their
imported neoimpressionist or neo-
fauvian predecessors. Despite a
Michile Baj Strobel is an art historian
and anthropologist at the Ecole
Rdgionale d'Artes Plastiques de la
Martinique.
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veneer of "local color" dependent
on a folklorization of the paintings'
themes, there was little to distin-
guish them from any other tradi-
tion of regionalist painting.
Quest for Identity
Today's generation of active
Martiniquan painters has been
attempting to break the yoke of ar-
tistic imitation and borrowing, fo-
cusing instead on a transformation
of the artist's message and a redefi-
nition and expansion of artistic
techniques. This generation has
been preoccupied with a search for
"roots," for which Cesaire in some
sense laid the foundations. This
quest for the source has been a pri-
mary concern for members of the
Negro-Caraibe movement, leading
some of them back to Africa itself.
These new thrusts were spe-
cifically designed to break away
from the European aesthetic pres-
ence, to sweep the decks clean
of a strongly imitative tradition.
Graphic artists who formed the
group Fromajeiin 1984 wanted to
underscore the syncretic character
of Antillean identity: the African
and Amerindian heritages were
used to create the crucible of a new
artistic movement, a fabric woven
out of a heterogeneous assortment
of cultural threads.
In the meeting of these diverse
influences and mixings, which con-
tinues to characterize Martinique
in the 1990s, many different contri-
butions come together. There is a
simultaneous tendency, however,
to envision them somewhat simplis-
tically as either the products of a
single (mythologized) African real-
ity or the direct outgrowth of Amer-
indian and Maroon influences.
The search for authenticity is thus
reduced to a gilded rescue mis-
sion-a kind of archeological nos-
talgia--designed to substitute for
the whole tradition of Western
painting. It is a strategy still firmly
based on an imitative process and
does little more than sidestep the
question of origins: Maroons or
Amerindians may become the pre-
ferred referent, but what is really
happening is the substitution of
one model for another.
Part of the problem is the fail-
ure to recognize that true authen-
ticity is not preserved, but rather
produced. This inherent weakness
leads to a multitude of dilemmas.
What does the artist start with or
merge with, and to whom does he
pay allegiance? Should one begin
by staking out a territory, a kind of
ancestral land, from which one can
paint from the heart? And then pol-
ish up one's roots in order to allow
an artistic blossoming based on self-
selected origins? Is not identity con-
tinually being reconstructed? What
society today can boast of a single
cultural origin?
From Martinique
In June 1989 Martiniquan painter
Ernest Breleur, a member of the
Negro-Caraibe movement, exhib-
ited a series of 50 paintings in Fort
de France. This show was to mark
his break with Fromaj, which he
helped found immediately after
completing his studies in Paris.
He speaks of his involvement in
Fromaji as a necessary step, but one
that eventually led to a dead end.
"I came to realize that I was using
forms that had already had an-
other life, that I was simply insert-
ing them into a new context, and
that I didn't need to draw on them
anymore. We took comfort in Afri-
can and Arawak motifs and created
for them a kind of authenticity or
recognition value, as if the mean-
ing would follow on its own."
His goal now, along with other
Caribbean artists he associates
with, is to explode this closed
world. He had an exhibition in
September 1990 in Caracas and is
now arranging one in France, since
it is clear that a French Antillean
artist's career now depends on Pari-
sian galleries as surely as an Antil-
lean writer's does on the literary
programs of French television.
Breleur stresses his wish to lay
bare his individuality in his cur-
rent work; he is engaged in a self-
conscious attempt to be part of a
current Western reality, which para-
doxically has the effect of isolating
him within an Antillean context.
This personal choice, and his posi-
tive affirmation of solitude, consti-
tute the motivating force behind
his creative work.
Over the past two years, Breleur
has thus liberated himself through
paintings of a fictional world that
relates more to myth than to daily
life. These untitled canvases cata-
logue the varieties of the drama of
existence. Headless women of volu-
minous proportions travel through
a nocturnal space dominated by
the moon. They try to fly, to touch
or to.capture the heavenly body,
sometimes close, sometimes dis-
tant, creating precarious scaffold-
(Painting by Ernest Breleur; photographed by Rene Maran)
ing and subterfuges to reach it. In
some paintings, the obsessive pres-
ence of an eminently expressive
dog brings things down to earth.
Yet this framework serves to
open, up the world of the imagina-
tion./Search for the moon? For the
impossible? Initiation quest? In all
probability, it is a uniting of two
worlds. The portrayal of nocturnal
flight represents the precarious-
ness of human activity: a shaky scaf-
folding poised somewhere between
the real and the imagined. Paint-
ing then becomes the transfigura-
tion and transgression of desire
into reality, but it is the passage
itself that is open to view-with
humor and agitation. At times the
hybrid women, making their way to-
ward some kind of metamorphosis,
are clinging, and express a message
embedded in all mythology: the
struggle against mortality. In their
flight, they traverse the canvas
against the background of a flat
horizon, and explode in a shatter-
ing burst of sensual corporeality.
Beyond the initial imagery,
these paintings are also the trav-
ersing of a culture, of a style, since
such figures in flight and metamor-
phosis are a constant of creole oral
tradition. It speaks from within,
with oral motifs that rest on tales
told in the course of wakes in the
full moonlight, which, through agri-
cultural cycles and religious rituals,
exerts a powerful influence on
French Antillean society. *
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Does Anyone Remember?
President George Bush's long-
awaited trip to South America in
December 1990 was clearly up-
staged by the looming war in the
Persian Gulf. As journalist Law-
rence Weschler wrote: "Each morn-
ing ... newspaper readers could
open to a front page picture of
Bush pounding home some new
point about Saddam Hussein,
flanked by some new incidentally-
identified-if-only-in-passing (and
entirely interchangeable) Latin
American head of state. ... Collor
and Menem and Aylwin in turn
were allowed to stand in as substi-
tutes for the role usually reserved
for this year's cerebral palsy poster
child at the latest Oval Office
photo-op" (Columbia Journalism
Review, January/February 1991,
p. 10.)
Right Place, Wrong Time
Senior US military advisers were
in the Panamanian police head-
quarters during the early hours of
December 5, 1990, looking for
Colonel Eduardo Herrera, who
had escaped by helicopter from a
Naos Island jail outside the city.
Just as they were about to leave the
building, who should arrive? None
other than Herrera himself, in
search of reinforcements to accom-
pany him on a march to the coun-
try's Asamblea Legislativa building.
Following an armed stand-off be-
tween the two sides, Herrera was ap-
prehended by US troops called in
by the panicky military advisers.
Watch Out, No. 1
Latin American and Caribbean
shrimp exporters may find the US
market closed as of May 1, 1991.
As a result of a bill passed by Sena-
tors Bennett Johnston and John
Breaux, both Democrats of Louisi-
ana, federal guidelines have been
established for a three-year plan
to use turtle excluder devices in
shrimp nets. A country such as Mex-
ico stands to lose nearly $310 mil-
lion in sales and 8,000 jobs.
Watch Out, No. 2
Japanese trading companies may
be the biggest winners in the
hemispheric race to link markets
through free-trade agreements.
Originally dedicated to the ex-
change of goods between Japan
and Latin America, the companies
are increasingly sending their trade
to third parties. One such com-
pany, Mitsui, now directs 33% of its
trade to third parties. The com-
pany conducts $2 billion annually
in trade for its Latin American
operations.
Haven't They Read Adam Smith?
The hand that guides Latin Ameri-
ca's emerging "free markets" may
not be so invisible after all. In a
Washington Post article (December
2, 1990), reporter Eugene Robin-
son dismisses the free-market
policies of many of the region's
countries as a "veneer." He writes
that "Underneath lies an ingrained
system of winks, nods, kickbacks,
bribes and outright corruption that
will take many years to root out."
Wake Up-Before It's Too Late
A telling communique was issued
by the Third Europe/Caribbean
Conference, held in Kingston,
Jamaica, November 29-30, 1990.
According to the statement, "the
region had not grasped that tradi-
tional links to metropolitan states
and certain commitment on aid,
based on East/West polarisation,
were coming to an end and that
models of development would
need to be changed." The key ques-
tion? "How a single Caribbean mar-
ket, involving all countries of the
region, will fit into the economic
environment of a world split into
major trading blocs." The gather-
ing was sponsored by the West
India Committee of London.
Don't Judge a Banana by Its Peel
Commonwealth Caribbean ba-
nanas have long enjoyed privileged
access to the British market, where
75% of the fruit consumed is from
the region. When the single Euro-
pean market becomes a reality in
1992, bananas from Latin America
will threaten the Caribbean's priv-
ileged position. According to the
Financial Times (December 13,
1990), Caribbean producers are
worried--especially because the
quality of fruit exported to Britain
in 1990 "was the worst since 1987."
Particularly troubling are spots on
the banana peel that give the Carib-
bean variant an "inferior look."
Though Caribbean producers
counter that their product is bet-
ter tasting, they know that "for
someone to get at this superior-
tasting fruit, he first has to peel it,
but if the peel is unattractive, it
does not get open...."
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Division of Labor
Amid the chaos of Peruvian poli-
tics, it seems the country's guerrilla
groups have now divided their tar-
gets. According to the Latin Amer-
ican Report (December 1990)
published by the Anti-Defamation
League of the B'nai B'rith, the
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac
Amaru has been targeting syn-
agogues andJewish-owned busi-
nesses in Lima. Meanwhile, Sendero
Luminoso guerrillas have targeted
evangelicals throughout the coun-
try and are allegedly responsible
for the deaths of some 300 evangeli-
cal pastors during the 1980s.
Tread on Me
The Journal of Commerce (January
14, 1991) reports that Brazilian
businesses will take advantage of a
new open-door trade policy to
import used tires from the US and
Europe. One company, StarAm, ex-
pects to import between 35,000
and 100,000 tires in 1991. The eco-
nomics of the transaction make
sense. New tires retail in Brazil for
$50 each. The same tire, used,
costs $3.00 in US markets. Adding
freight and a 20% duty, the tires
cost $9 each in Brazil. Even if re-
treaded tires sell for about $20, it
will mean a substantial savings for
Brazilian consumers.
Who Wins, Who Loses?
A report by the US commercial
section in Chile suggests that US
farm exports to the country could
increase between $5 million and
$15 million a year if a free-trade
agreement between the two coun-
tries were established. US products
most likely to benefit are cotton,
soybean oil, soy meal, barley, seeds,
meat, dry milk, and sugar. Cur-
rently, imports of these products
are limited because of a 15% across-
the-board duty. The report notes
that Chilean exporters are wary of
any agreement, since the elimina-
tion of US tariffs, averaging 2-5%,
would not have much impact.
I'll Take the High Ground
Hurricane forecasting is a delicate
art at best. Yet we are now told by
Professor William M. Gray of Colo-
rado State University that "the in-
cidence of intense hurricanes
making landfall on the US coast
and in the Caribbean basin will
likely increase during the 1990s
and early years of the 21st century
to levels of activity greater than
were observed in the 1970s and
1980s" (Science, September 1990,
pp. 1251-56). Gray observes that
variation in intense hurricane activ-
ity is closely linked to variation in
summer rainfall in the Sahel re-
gion of West Africa. An apparent
break in the Sahel's 18-year
drought pattern during 1988-89
portends a higher probability for
hurricanes during this decade.
Finally, Something to Celebrate
Amid patriotic flag-waving and
marimba music, the Dominican Re-
public defeated Venezuela 13-1 to
win the Caribbean Baseball Series
on February 9, 1991, in Miami's
Bobby Maduro Stadium. The
Miami Herald (February 10, 1991)
E
reported that a nine-run explosion
scored by the island team in the
first inning left Dominican fans
"giddy, [and] dancing gleefully in
front of their seats near the third
base line."
New-Age Marxism?
CheddiJagan, die-hard Marxist
and long-time leader of the
People's Progressive Party of Guy-
ana, visited Miami in December
1990 to proclaim his new approach
to government. Speaking before a
forum organized by local Guyanese
supporters, the US-trained dentist
illustrated a keen grasp on the state
of the world. Urging US interven-
tion to assure free and fair elec-
tions in 1991, and pushing free
enterprise and foreign investment,
his message could not have been
better received. His audience? A
group of local Republican Party
members.
On the Move
Bill Perrin, formerly deputy assis-
tant secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian affairs of the Depart-
ment of State, has been named
executive director of the Inter-
American Foundation. Perrin was
US ambassador to Cyprus in 1987-
89, and during his tenure the em-
bassy received an award as one of
the most efficiently run US mis-
sions in the world. Perrin has also
served as the Peace Corps' regional
director for Africa, its director for
the Eastern Caribbean, and be-
tween 1982 and 1984, as the Peace
Corps' director for Belize.
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Free Trade: Can Mexico Win?
by Steven E. Sanderson
Sith the collapseof the multilateralGATT (General
Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade)
negotiations in
Brussels on December 7, 1990, the
spotlight turned to free-trade nego-
tiations between the US and Mex-
ico. The prospect of a free-trade
agreement is the current focus of
US-Mexican relations, overshadow-
ing drugs, immigration, and other
bilateral issues. This attention is re-
markable because formal free-trade
negotiations have yet to be author-
ized by the US Congress and are
unlikely to take shape before the
spring of 1991. Since free trade was
inaugurated as a policy prospect
during President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari's visit to Washington in
the spring of 1990, excitement has
been generated without a clearly ar-
ticulated set of goals for the agree-
ment. Congressional hearings,
newspaper features, presidential
visits, and animated lobbying have
Steven E. Sanderson is professor of polit-
ical science and director of the Tropical
Conservation and Development Pro-
gram at the Center for Latin American
Studies, University of Florida. He is a
member of Hemisphere's editorial ad-
visory board. His most recent book is
The Politics of Trade in Latin
American Development (Stanford
University Press, forthcoming).
all begun on the basis of a provoca-
tive but hardly novel idea.
In spite of the high profile en-
thusiasm of the Bush and Salinas
administrations, significant Mexi-
can and US opposition to free
trade cannot be discounted. For
instance, US trade unions categori-
cally oppose the free-trade agree-
ment on grounds that the bilateral
relationship will be a cause of lost
jobs in the US. The unions con-
tend that a broad agreement would
"do little to improve the lives of
Mexican workers" and would "en-
courage greater capital outflows
from the US further harming
the US industrial base" (AFL-CIO
Executive Council, May 24, 1990)
In the US House of Representa-
tives, opposition has turned into a
nascent movement to deny Presi-
dent Bush fast-track authority for
the negotiations. Meanwhile, agri-
cultural producer groups in Flor-
ida, Texas, and California worry
about lost markets. From automo-
biles to textiles and winter vege-
tables, such concerns echo in the
antechamber of the free-trade talks.
Opposition in Mexico is less ar-
ticulate because of the nature of
the country's public policy process
and the fragmented condition of
political opposition so far Much of
Salinas's foreign economic policy is
consistent with rightist political
goals, and the popular base of left
opposition alternatives has been
without voice in official Mexican
politics for at least the past decade.
The Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas camp
is forming an alternative national-
ist political voice, but it has not
been as visible or as coherent as
the Salinas government's call for
free trade. Yet the quiescence of
high profile opposition should not
delude policymakers into thinking
that Mexico is at one with the
Salinas government on the free-
trade issue.
The endorsement of a free-
trade agreement by the executives
of both countries and its appeal to
the policymaking public are ap-
propriate indicators of two sets of
change: the economic transforma-
tion occurring in Mexico and US
efforts to make bilateral policies
reflect a special relationship with
"our neighbor to the south." The
Salinas government considers free
trade to be its best bet for national
economic recovery. For the Bush
administration, it is a flashy fall-
back strategy, after eight years of
GATT negotiations have crumbled.
Free trade is the most pressing di-
mension of a regional strategy laid
out in Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, which calls for
a free-trade area "from Alaska to
Antarctica." And it builds on the
much invoked but little observed
"special relationship" between
Washington and Mexico City (see
"Congress Responds," p. 19)
However appealing the idea
of US-Mexican free trade, little is
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tion and effective exchange-rate
management. Moreover, represen-
tatives of the US textile workers'
unions have raised questions about
the size of potential markets in
Mexico for US exports of fabric
and apparel. While proponents of
free trade wax poetic about a Mexi-
can market of 85 million, effective
demand may be limited to a popu-
lation of 8 million. With 21 million
Mexicans living beneath the World
Bank poverty level, the depth of
the Mexican market is open to
question.
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security policy in the 1920s in-
cluded the exhortation not to allow
Cuba or Nicaragua to become "the
next Mexico." In the postwar era,
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only denominator of US foreign
economic policy toward Mexican
liberalization, stability cannot mo-
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cultural producer groups in Flor-
ida, Texas, and California worry
about lost markets. From automo-
biles to textiles and winter vege-
tables, such concerns echo in the
antechamber of the free-trade talks.
Opposition in Mexico is less ar-
ticulate because of the nature of
the country's public policy process
and the fragmented condition of
political opposition so far Much of
Salinas's foreign economic policy is
consistent with rightist political
goals, and the popular base of left
opposition alternatives has been
without voice in official Mexican
economic recovery. I or the Bush
administration, it is a flashy fall-
back strategy, after eight years of
GATT negotiations have crumbled.
Free trade is the most pressing di-
mension of a regional strategy laid
out in Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, which calls for
a free-trade area "from Alaska to
Antarctica." And it builds on the
much invoked but little observed
"special relationship" between
Washington and Mexico City (see
"Congress Responds," p. 19)
However appealing the idea
of US-Mexican free trade, little is
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known about its possible dimen-
sions or effects. A free-trade agree-
ment could instigate revolutionary
changes in Mexico, precisely be-
cause of the special-or as many
Mexicans might describe it, inexor-
able-relationship between Mexico
and the US, and because of their
tremendous difference in size. The
US implications could be immedi-
ate, if less systemic. An agreement's
impact would likely be felt in Mexi-
can labor markets that provide new
migrants to the US. It could liter-
ally transform the Mexican land-
scape by changing the structure
of agriculture. It could swallow a
border industry program that has
grown to 1,700 firms and 500,000
employees. And it is far from outra-
geous to suggest that free trade
could bear directly on the future
stability of Mexico's political system
and thereby US national security in-
terests as well. Accordingly both
countries should undertake negoti-
ations with a serious appreciation
of the stakes.
It is easy, nonetheless, to over-
estimate the impact of a free-trade
agreement. Many economists con-
cede that free trade may mean lit-
tle to Mexican development
without adequate fiscal interven-
tion and effective exchange-rate
management. Moreover, represen-
tatives of the US textile workers'
unions have raised questions about
the size of potential markets in
Mexico for US exports of fabric
and apparel. While proponents of
free trade wax poetic about a Mexi-
can market of 85 million, effective
demand may be limited to a popu-
lation of 8 million. With 21 million
Mexicans living beneath the World
Bank poverty level, the depth of
the Mexican market is open to
question.
Little is clear about the specifics
or timing of a free-trade agree-
ment. Still, the long-standing na-
ture of US-Mexican relations and
the "creeping integration" of the
last decade make the context of
the negotiations fairly clear At this
early stage, it is critical to sketch
some likely dimensions-and bell-
wethers of success or failure.
The Security Connection
The US government has tradition-
ally viewed developments in Mex-
ico as a national security matter It
was, after all, Mexico that was held
up as the hemispheric "red men-
ace" during the country's revolu-
tionary period (1910-34) US
security policy in the 1920s in-
cluded the exhortation not to allow
Cuba or Nicaragua to become "the
next Mexico." In the postwar era,
the US government combined
security against communism with
economic development as its two
pillars of foreign policy toward
Mexico. At least since the Kennedy
administration's initiatives to pro-
mote free trade with Mexico, US
S
national security interest has em-
phasized actions to enhance the
political and economic stability in
Mexico.
The current proposal for free-
trade negotiations with Mexico has
borrowed some of the old lan-
guage.Joint Economic Committee
hearings in October 1990 were
filled with references to the need
to marry economic progress with
stability in the free-trade agree-
ment. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)
issued a plea for "domestic under-
standing of the importance of
Latin American economic growth
and political stability on important
issues for this country." A free-
trade agreement, however, implic-
itly goes against that grain because
it will surely underwrite and acceler-
ate the sort of "dynamic instability"
in Mexico that has been the nature
of Mexican politics all along.
This change is appropriate, per-
haps even overdue. The reason is
that the prospects for progressive
change in Mexico are tied directly
to Mexico's willingness to confront
systemic transformation, with all
the instability that might imply.
What is going on economically
in Mexico means not only the
"proper mix" of external stabiliza-
tion, free trade, structural adjust-
ment, and privatization. It also
means messy and unpredictable
political change, which will call on
the US to revisit its foreign policy
goals concerning Mexico.
The leading edge of the US role
is the trade relationship. Drugs, im-
migration, and other issues now
trail the free-trade bandwagon.
But, just as trade cannot be the
only denominator of US foreign
economic policy toward Mexican
liberalization, stability cannot mo-
nopolize Washington's thinking
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about long-term bilateral security
interests. Two elements that betray
serious US misunderstanding of
the perils of free trade are oil and
immigration.
Playing the Oil Card
Since the mid-1970s Mexico has
been a major actor in international
oil markets, the largest Latin Ameri-
can exporter outside OPEC, and a
free rider on OPEC international
price management. The US has
viewed Mexican oil as an opportu-
nity to secure oil sources outside of
the OPEC system, and as a sort of
barter vehicle for US support of
the Mexican government in hard
times. As one example, the Reagan
administration's 1982-83 "bailout"
of Mexico in the first wave of the
debt crisis involved advance pur-
chase of Mexican oil when US
supplies were abundant. The
free-trade initiative complicates
Mexico's opportunity to trade on
its oil with the US, and may actually
undermine the long-term ability of
the US to take advantage of Mexi-
can oil (see "A Mexican Agenda,"
p. 21 ) Why is this so?
First, if Mexico becomes inte-
grated into a unified North Amer-
ican market, domestic Mexican
energy demands will increase
apace. A higher proportion of oil
production will go to domestic in-
dustries and modern agriculture,
to fuel any of the economic scenar-
ios now envisioned under the free-
trade agreement. Such a prognosis
leaves less oil for export to the US,
thus bringing general US-Mexican
relations into policy conflict with
specific oil-based security policies.
Second, Mexico may be unable
to satisfy both domestic demand
and foreign exchange require-
ments met by oil exports without
increasing capital investment in
PEMEX, the state oil monopoly.
PEMEX production is holding
steady at about 2.5 million barrels
per day, but some analysts project a
decline to 1.5 million over the next
decade. According to the Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly (January 15,
1990), the Mexican government
estimates investment requirements
for oil over the next five years to
reach a stunning $48 billion. De-
spite Mexico's economic stagna-
tion of the 1980s, its domestic
demand has been growing at 7%
per year Even without the added
energy demands of a free-trade
agreement, Mexico will be hard
pressed to meet its domestic needs
at a reasonable price.
The supply side of this problem
could be partly addressed by open-
ing PEMEX to foreign investment,
as has already occurred to some ex-
tent in petrochemicals. But Mexico
risks major political upheaval if it
opens PEMEX to foreign investors,
in light of the symbolic-indeed,
constitutional-importance of the
national mineral patrimony. Capi-
tal for investment in oil may not ap-
pear unless concessions to foreign
investors are made. Therein lies
the problem: in order to fulfill one-
of the most important bilateral
security roles envisioned for
Mexico, its oil monopoly must be
opened to foreign involvement pro-
scribed by both the revolutionary
constitution of 1917 and the tradi-
tion of oil legislation since. Fur-
ther, the prospect of nationalist
opposition to a large wave of for-
eign direct investment is not re-
stricted to oil.
The US is focused on Mexican
oil-especially since the Persian
Gulf Crisis-and has become more
insistent on opening Mexican oil to
the free-trade negotiations. The Sa-
linas government, meanwhile, has
not yet compromised its commit-
ment to a national oil industry. It is
unclear, however, that either side is
appreciative of the stakes of the oil
game. Is the US viewing oil as part
of a larger security dimension of
the talks? Has the US considered
the likely shifts in the oil sector
that would likely accompany bilat-
eral integration?
Feet People
Practically since the beginning of
modern Mexico, the country has
exchanged labor with its neigh-
bors: exports of workers to the US,
imports of workers from Central
America and the Caribbean, and
many other variations on this
theme. For its part, the US has
sought to control the flow of un-
documented workers into the US
from Mexico, through border inter-
diction, official immigration re-
forms, and guest worker programs.
It is commonly accepted on both
sides of the border that official poli-
cies are inadequate to La Raza's es-
timated 2-3 million Mexicans living
illegally in the US or to those who
travel back and forth. The US
government-sponsored Asencio
Commission for the Study of Inter-
national Migration and Coopera-
tive Economic Development
(1990) characterizes trade as "the
single most important long-term
remedy to the problem."
In fact, trade may not be the
solution, but rather a further ag-
gravation of the problem. The
Asencio Commission correctly
observed that the short-term effect
of a free-trade agreement would
probably be an increase in labor
flows from Mexico to the US. In
the long term, according to the
Commission, trade will diminish
the flow of Mexican labor to the
US. Is this long-term prediction
well-founded?
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Salinas has requested that
immigration, or "labor flows," be
included in the free-trade negotia-
tions. The US government, when
asked about Salinas's statement
that oil not be included in the ne-
gotiations, said that "It is prema-
ture to take things off the table"
(Bureau of National Affairs, June
27, 1990) In the same breath, how-
ever, the US rejected the Mexican
view that labor flows across the bor-
der should be discussed. "Labor is
not a trade item factors of pro-
duction are not trade issues."
A look at European Community
(EC) expansion shows that labor
flows can be very much a part of
tighter economic integration
through trade. In the course of
EC expansion, the slow, phased in-
tegration of Greece, Portugal, and
Spain addressed the potential prob-
lem of labor flows from South to
North. It also paid adjustment assis-
tance to ensure that domestic eco-
nomic opportunities ameliorated
the prospect of huge labor out-
flows from the poorer nations.
Many differences stand in the way
of generalizing from the EC case.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to
categorically reject the potential
for labor migration, especially in
light of the tremendous labor-force
adjustment likely in a US-Mexican
free-trade agreement.
But does US rejection or accep-
tance of migration issues make a
difference? Yes, in the formal sense
of making progress on a variety of
labor issues of particular impor-
tance to the Mexican government.
To say that labor is not a trade item
is to misunderstand completely-
or to deny disingenuously-the
connection between the structure
and potential of the Mexican econ-
omy and the stock and flow of work-
ers wishing to migrate to the US.
Whether or not the US and Mexico
consider immigration as part of the
trade agenda, the tremendous
"labor-force adjustment" in Mexico
that must accompany any signifi-
cant free-trade agreement will ex-
press itself partly as Mexican
workers in the US.
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Former president Ronald
Reagan, trying to scare the US pub-
lic into acceptance of US military
involvement in Central America,
invoked the specter of "feet peo-
ple," terrestrial versions of the be-
nighted boat people. Negotiators
could do well to consider such agri-
cultural "factors of production,"
who may become the agricultural
and environmental feet people of
the future.
Maize and the Multilateral
Shadow
It is difficult to tell what the spe-
cific effects of trade liberalization
will be on Mexican rural life. One
of the most popular ways of dis-
cussing the issue of trade liberali-
zation's benefits to a country in the
multilateral system is to model its
impact on domestic economic wel-
fare. Dale Hathaway's analysis of ag-
ricultural trade policy cites Mexico
as the only country studied in Latin
America where global free-trade
conditions would cause producer
welfare to deteriorate. The analysis
predicts that, if rich Western coun-
tries alone were to liberalize mar-
kets, and if Mexico were not to
reciprocate, then Mexico's pro-
ducer welfare would improve, but
its consumer welfare would worsen.
Mexico is so different from the
rest of Latin America on this score
because of the deep, historical con-
nection of agriculture to its rural
social policy. Agricultural subsidies
in Mexico have been directly con-
nected to the rural wage. The
prices of maize, bean, and other
basic foods are a straightforward in-
dicator of poor farmer welfare. In-
sofar as the Mexican government
has supported the prices of basic
food production at an adequate
level, it has enabled poor campe-
sinos to survive in the countryside.
Thus, rural living conditions im-
mediately deteriorated with the re-
moval of input and farm-gate price
supports over the past several years.
What does this have to do with
bilateral trade? Consider that in
1988 nearly two-thirds of ejidatarios
(roughly, public-sector poor farm-
ers) planted maize as their princi-
pal crop, even after six years of
reduced subsidies and destatization
of the rural economy. Although
maize production in Mexico is not
price competitive with the US, it
continues because of broad public-
sector support. Open to free trade,
how many of those 2 million or so
poor rural producers-and their
families-would be sacrificed to
market rationality? Where would
they go for their livelihoods?
Now that the GATT negotia-
tions have failed, agricultural trade
talks have taken on a hemispheric
focus, with the Mexican negotia-
tions in the lead. Mexico, after all,
is regularly among the top three or
four agricultural trade partners of
the US, and European consolida-
tion and agricultural protectionism
add importance to Mexico as a US
market. Before the debt crisis and
Salinastroika, the only barriers be-
tween poor smallholders and
ejidatarioswere domestic market
protection from imports and the
maintenance of farm incomes
through expensive subsidies. The
subsidies are well along on the
slide to elimination. If negotiations
insist on freer trade in agriculture,
then maize, bean, sorghum, and
squash producers in central Mex-
ico, along with their food produc-
ing counterparts on richer land,
are likely to fall by the wayside. The
reason would be either competitive
US exports of basic grains and oil
seeds, or market-mandated shifts to
cash crops they cannot exploit.
This issue, however, has not made
it onto the official agenda, and the
testimony and literature support-
ing free-trade conveniently leaves it
out of the discussion.
Still, Mexican exporters of
fresh fruits and vegetables have
succeeded because of the incorpo-
ration of advanced technology and
inputs into a cheap labor market
with ready access to an expanding
US consumer market. Under con-
ditions of free trade, one might
reasonably expect more winter
vegetable, table grape, and other
fruit production to move from the
US to Mexico, particularly if the
US removes its own agricultural
subsidy programs and faces increas-
ing competition for inputs such as
water. In the words of a California
agricultural consultant, "You're
going to see more movement in ag-
riculture southward from Califor-
nia as water becomes scarcer, and
as issues of fertilizer use, high land
costs and potential labour short-
ages loom larger" (Euromoney,
September 1989).
This prospect is tempered by
recent findings that winter vegeta-
bles are slightly more expensive to
produce in Mexico than in the US.
Also pertinent is the relative sta-
bility of Mexico's market share in
winter vegetables over the past
15 years, despite competitive deval-
uations, technological innovation,
and relatively free markets. Such
stability raises questions about the
general boon to Mexican agricul-
ture of a free-trade agreement. In
any event, the promise of fresh
fruit and vegetable exports for Mex-
ican economic development is en-
ergy intensive, resource limited,
and broadly responsible for some
of the worst agricultural abuses of
Mexico's environment.
The potential for Mexican
exports to play a role in US food
policy in times of inflation is well
established. It became especially ap-
20 Hemisphere . Winter/Spring 1991
some movement away trom mvexi-
can production of food crops for
domestic consumption to produc-
tion of more remunerative crops
for the US market. Mexico is al-
ready moving away from water
resource subsidization, which will
bolster the position of large agri-
business.
Using history as a guide, the
political tensions of agricultural
free trade are detrimental to both
the US and Mexico. For more than
a decade, Florida agriculturalists
and their representatives have
been railing against initiatives for
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Reagan, trying to scare the US pub-
lic into acceptance of US military
involvement in Central America,
invoked the specter of "feet peo-
ple," terrestrial versions of the be-
nighted boat people. Negotiators
could do well to consider such agri-
cultural "factors of production,"
who may become the agricultural
and environmental feet people of
the future.
Maize and the Multilateral
Shadow
It is difficult to tell what the spe-
cific effects of trade liberalization
will be on Mexican rural life. One
of the most popular ways of dis-
cussing the issue of trade liberali-
zation's benefits to a country in the
multilateral system is to model its
impact on domestic economic wel-
fare. Dale Hathaway's analysis of ag-
ricultural trade policy cites Mexico
as the only country studied in Latin
America where global free-trade
conditions would cause producer
welfare to deteriorate. The analysis
predicts that, if rich Western coun-
tries alone were to liberalize mar-
kets, and if Mexico were not to
reciprocate, then Mexico's pro-
ducer welfare would improve, but
its consumer welfare would worsen.
Mexico is so different from the
rest of Latin America on this score
because of the deep, historical con-
nection of agriculture to its rural
social policy. Agricultural subsidies
in Mexico have been directly con-
nected to the rural wage. The
prices of maize, bean, and other
basic foods are a straightforward in-
dicator of poor farmer welfare. In-
sofar as the Mexican government
has supported the prices of basic
food production at an adequate
level, it has enabled poor campe-
sinos to survive in the countryside.
Thus, rural living conditions im-
mediately deteriorated with the re-
moval of input and farm-gate price
supports over the past several years.
What does this have to do with
bilateral trade? Consider that in
1988 nearly two-thirds of ejidatarios
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(roughly, public-sector poor farm-
ers) planted maize as their princi-
pal crop, even after six years of
reduced subsidies and destatization
of the rural economy. Although
maize production in Mexico is not
price competitive with the US, it
continues because of broad public-
sector support. Open to free trade,
how many of those 2 million or so
poor rural producers--and their
families---would be sacrificed to
market rationality? Where would
they go for their livelihoods?
Now that the GATT negotia-
tions have failed, agricultural trade
talks have taken on a hemispheric
focus, with the Mexican negotia-
tions in the lead. Mexico, after all,
is regularly among the top three or
four agricultural trade partners of
the US, and European consolida-
tion and agricultural protectionism
add importance to Mexico as a US
market. Before the debt crisis and
Salinastroika, the only barriers be-
tween poor smallholders and
ejidatarioswere domestic market
protection from imports and the
maintenance of farm incomes
through expensive subsidies. The
subsidies are well along on the
slide to elimination. If negotiations
insist on freer trade in agriculture,
then maize, bean, sorghum, and
squash producers in central Mex-
ico, along with their food produc-
ing counterparts on richer land,
uations, technological innovation,
and relatively free markets. Such
stability raises questions about the
general boon to Mexican agricul-
ture of a free-trade agreement. In
any event, the promise of fresh
fruit and vegetable exports for Mex-
ican economic development is en-
ergy intensive, resource limited,
and broadly responsible for some
of the worst agricultural abuses of
Mexico's environment.
The potential for Mexican
exports to play a role in US food
policy in times of inflation is well
established. It became especially ap-
parent in the days of the Carter ad-
ministration, which was whipsawed
by the so-called "Florida Tomato
War" with Mexico and high infla-
tion in the US. Federal officials in
the US considered expanded Mexi-
can production to be part of an
overall bilateral relationship and
part of the policy tool kit available
to keep consumer prices down.
There are new opportunities to
take advantage of Mexico's export
potential to serve the US economy.
As happened in the past, however,
critical issues of adjustment and sus-
tainability are being understated.
Without trouble, Florida could
be substituted for California in the
quote about the southward relo-
cation of agriculture. The Florida
Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services has already peti-
tioned the US government to ex-
empt Florida's $1.5 billion winter
vegetable and $6 billion citrus in-
dustries from a free-trade agree-
ment (Tampa Tribune, December
12, 1990). Obviously, free trade sug-
gests an adjustment problem on
the US side of the border, but the
environmental damage done by
Florida, Texas, and California agri-
culture has been significant. Adjust-
ment away from Florida produce
would also mean tremendous pres-
sures on land and water in Mexico.
While it would be foolhardy to pre-
dict specific outcomes, it is not un-
reasonable to expect the following
shifts: higher land prices in Mex-
ico; more competition for water in
Mexico's rich river valleys; and
some movement away from Mexi-
can production of food crops for
domestic consumption to produc-
tion of more remunerative crops
for the US market. Mexico is al-
ready moving away from water
resource subsidization, which will
bolster the position of large agri-
business.
Using history as a guide, the
political tensions of agricultural
free trade are detrimental to both
the US and Mexico. For more than
a decade, Florida agriculturalists
and their representatives have
been railing against initiatives for
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free trade with Mexico in competi-
tive produce. At the height of the
tomato war, Florida's agriculture
commissioner Doyle Conner even
warned that "a Mexican tomato
OPEC" would undermine the well-
being of the US public. Mexico has
never held a tomato to the throat
of the West, and imports have
never drastically reduced the US
market share.
For Mexico, the prospect of
freer trade in winter vegetables
means greater "technological
equalization" across the border.
That is, Mexican producers would
compete by adopting additional in-
ternational technology while rely-
ing on the low price of labor to
give them a slight international
edge. So far, this process has
meant the economic dislocation
of poor campesinos. It has encour-
aged greater internal migration in
Mexico, as vegetable producers pre-
fer not to use local workers. It has
also caused increased farming on
hillsides and other fragile land;
emigration from countryside to
city, and from the Mesa Central to
the northern border; and addi-
tional crowding in Mexico's non-
farm employment sectors.
Transnational Integration by
Maquiladoras
One focus of free-trade talks is the
so-called maquiladoras, shorthand
for the "in-bond" industries that
grew out of the Border Industrial-
ization Program and its successors.
Maquiladoras have grown tremen-
dously, especially since exchange-
rate policy in Mexico made border
investment more attractive. From
employing scarcely 4,000 employ-
ees in 57 plants in 1966, the indus-
tries have grown to employ roughly
a half million Mexicans in 1991.
In recent years, policies governing
industrial location have been re-
laxed, and 20% of the maquiladoras
now locate in Mexico's interior.
US economist Rudiger Dorn-
busch notes that the Mexican
government's restructuring plan
assumes an ability to run a large
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current-account surplus to simulta-
neously finance its foreign debt
and economic growth. He observes
that the government is counting
on maquiladora exports to continue
growing at their current rate, well
in excess of all other exports.
A free-trade agreement will
make the "in-bond" industries re-
dundant as a trade category, just as
they become central to the hopes
for Mexican industrial integration
with the North. If overall tariffs
and quantitative restrictions on the
US side are reduced, the special tar-
iff sections that make the status of
maquiladoras special will diminish
as well. If Mexicans are allowed to
import freely from the US, the "in-
bond" provisions that foreclose
domestic sale of maquila goods in
Mexico will become unnecessary.
Several concerns have arisen in
regard to the "liberation" of the
maquila industries, and the integra-
tion of Mexican industry in gen-
eral. For one, transnational
suppliers such as Japan or US
suppliers gone south might well
"crowd out" Mexican suppliers.
This depends on the nature of do-
mestic content rules and the adapt-
ability of Mexican suppliers to the
challenges of industrial moderni-
zation along international lines.
Nevertheless, transnationals could
either crowd out domestic competi-
tors or turn them into "clones" of
their suppliers in other countries.
Mexicans worry that a free-trade
agreement would offer an opening
for the effective transnationaliza-
tion of Mexican industry, as well as
a surrender of the complicated re-
quirements that seek to balance
the industrial imports and exports.
US businesses have already sug-
gested that one of the virtues of
free-trade is Mexico's potential to
become an "export trampoline" to
the rest of Latin America. Yet US
businesses, particularly in the ap-
parel and automobile industries,
worry that the Japanese and other
foreign interests would take similar
advantage of Mexico as a gateway
to the US market.
The environmental impact of
the regional relocation of maquila-
doras away from the border (or the
more likely location of new firms
away from the border) is another
basic concern. Official Mexican
encouragement of this process
responds not only to the positive
need for broadening the Mexican
industrial labor market, but to the
horrendous environmental impact
of industrial growth in Mexico's
largest cities. Compliance with en-
vironmental regulations in Mexico
is occasional, and many in the Mex-
ican government continue to view
protection of the environment as
"a luxury." US industries and the
border industries themselves are
hardly models of environmental
sensitivity; they regularly cite the
high cost of environmental protec-
tion and threaten to move away
from countries with stringent en-
vironmental regulations. Market
competition pushes private in-
dustry to seek the lowest common
denominator in environmental pol-
lution. In Mexico that denomina-
tor is very low indeed, since the
fiscal, administrative, and legal
wherewithal to protect the envi-
ronment are in short supply.
Other grave concerns involve
the degree to which foreign invest-
ors bear their share of the fiscal
burden of government services and
the provision of public goods in
areas where they have high impact.
The Salinas administration wants
desperately to attract direct foreign
investment, which runs counter to
the government's ability to de-
mand high tax rates from multina-
tionals, or from capital in general.
Traditionally known for low tax
rates and widespread tax evasion,
the Mexican state's ability to gar-
ner fiscal resources from the pri-
vate sector is extremely limited.
This weakness results in heavier re-
liance on traditional taxpayers (i.e.,
potential increases in the income
tax and taxes on savings), and on
attempts to increase public reve-
nues through greater enforcement
of existing tax codes.
Finally, the cross-regional inte-
gration of the maquiladoras in Mex-
ico will undoubtedly create more
pressure to supply domestic petro-
leum and gas at subsidized prices-
a key source of Mexico's industrial
competitiveness over the past de-
cade. It will also create pressure in
the US to legislate against such "up-
stream subsidies," a recurring issue
in Congress.
High Stakes
This analysis has not considered
the necessary complications of
bringing the Canadians into a trilat-
eral free-trade agreement. Nor
has it considered the wider hemi-
spheric and global implications.
Such matters aside, the impact
of a free-trade agreement will be
grossly different in the US and Mex-
ico. The adjustment in the US will
be modest, though specific sectors
such as textiles and steel will likely
feel the blow. Rural incomes policy
in the US does not ride on free
trade, as it does in Mexico. Political
stability and presidential succession
in the US are not at issue; in Mex-
ico, no less an ideological battle
than neoliberalism versus populist
nationalism is engaged.
Clearly Mexico's stakes in a free-
trade agreement are extraordinar-
ily high: the Salinas government
must deliver on its model of liberal-
ization, or the succeeding adminis-
tration will face a newly resurgent
economic nationalism. And the
wage share of any free-trade agree-
ment must allow the social impact
of free trade to be progressive.
How that can be accomplished is
unclear, since the "success" of Mexi-
can liberalization has been based
on suppressing consumer demand,
competitively devaluing the peso,
and crushing the real wage. It is
not unreasonable to say that the en-
tire Mexican economic program is
built on virtually unrestricted inte-
gration with the international econ-
omy, led by the US. Nonetheless,
the proof of the soundness of such
integration for the Mexican popula-
tion has yet to be demonstrated. *
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Free-Trade Lessons from Canada
by Ricardo Grinspun
n 1985 the Canadian govern-
ment announced its intention
to establish a free-trade agree-
ment with the US. From the
perspective of Brian Mulro-
ney's administration and its
free-trade orientation, there were
two main benefits to be derived
from such an agreement. First, it
would ensure Canadian access to
the US market, thereby fostering
further development of Canada's
natural-resource industries as well
as its export-oriented manufactur-
ing. And second, the competitive
pressures of a unified market
would stimulate an upswing in
the productivity performance of
Canadian industry.
Since the Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA) was imple-
mented in 1988, the results for Can-
ada have been discouraging. To be
sure, Canadian macroeconomic
policy and the current world reces-
sion bear a substantial share of the
blame for CUFTA's performance
to this point. Nevertheless, CUFTA
suffers from some basic limitations.
The short-term impact of those
Ricardo Grinspun is assistant professor
of economics and a fellow of the Center
for Research on Latin America and the
Caribbean at York University, Toronto,
Canada. He is currently involved in a
research project on the effects of free-
trade arrangements in North America.
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limitations on Canada merits the
attention of Mexican citizens and
policymakers as Mexico enters into
trilateral free-trade negotiations
with the US and Canada.
Market Access
CUFTA provides for a gradual
phasing out of Canadian-US bilat-
eral tariffs over the next ten years.
Although the eventual elimination
of such tariffs may seem impres-
sive, the fact that they were gener-
ally low to begin with diminishes
the measure's potential benefit for
Canadian exporters. Some Cana-
dian sectors that suffered from es-
calating US tariffs, such as those
involved with natural resource-
based products, will benefit. In
these cases, as envisioned by free-
trade proponents-the phasing out
of tariffs will encourage further do-
mestic processing of raw materials.
At the other end of the spectrum,
however, are the Canadian sectors
that previously enjoyed highly pro-
tective tariffs, such as textile and
furniture manufacturers. For these
sectors, tariff reduction has already
resulted in significant job losses.
Ensuring access to export mar-
kets requires the elimination of
both tariff and nontariff obstacles
to trade. Canadian exporters to the
US previously faced a commercial
obstacle course of nontariff impedi-
ments, such as red tape, technical
and safety standards, "voluntary"
restraint agreements, export sur-
charges, countervailing and anti-
dumping duties, and safeguard
measures. CUFTA's assistance in
removing these less obvious bar-
riers has been disappointing.
For one thing, Canada gained
little access to US government pro-
curement-a key objective of Ca-
nadian negotiators. For another,
many US and Canadian nontariff
barriers were grandfathered into
CUFTA. Given the Canadian objec-
tive of securing access to its main
export markets, the consequences
of such grandfathering have been
extremely negative for Canada. Yet
another problem is that Canada re-
mains vulnerable to future US pro-
tectionist policies. On the positive
side, the US and Canada did set up
a dispute-settlement mechanism to
resolve trade disputes. The mecha-
nism's effectiveness, however, is
limited by the fact that it is subordi-
nate to the laws of each country.
Macroeconomic Policy
The short-term effects of the free-
trade accord cannot be divorced
from the macroeconomic policies
of the Canadian government. In
this respect, the focus of Canada's
recent macroeconomic policy has
been anti-inflationary. As such it
has promoted high real interest
rates, a wide gap between Cana-
dian and US interest rates, and an
overvalued Canadian dollar. This
anti-inflationary focus has con-
tributed to Canada's current reces-
sion. In turn, the recession has
combined with the exchange-rate
imbalance to weaken the interna-
tional competitiveness of Canadian
industry, seriously hampering the
cornerstone of the government's
CUFTA objectives: investment in
the country's export-oriented
manufacturing.
Together, trade liberalization
and currency overvaluation have in-
creased the Canadian propensity to
spend money on the US side of the
border, which hurts not only Cana-
dian industry but commerce and
services as well. Canadians-most
of whom reside a short distance
from the border-are flocking to
the US in growing numbers to re-
stock on everything from elec-
tronics to clothing and gasoline.
This problem seriously restricts the
ability of Canadian firms to restruc-
ture their operations in response
to the free-trade agreement.
Productivity, Jobs, and
Investment
Productivity gains-the basis for
economic growth and higher living
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standards--were promised by the
Mulroney administration upon en-
tering into CUFTA negotiations.
Such gains, however, are not being
realized. A key reason is not trade
liberalization per se but rather the
mishandling of macroeconomic
policy by raising interest rates and
overvaluing the Canadian dollar.
This experience shows that the
elimination of trade barriers is not
enough to equalize productivity on
both sides of the border. Indeed,
raising productivity is linked to
policy in a broad array of spheres,
among which are education, job
training, regional development,
research and development, incen-
tives for technological advance-
ment, social programs, and public
health.
A fundamental problem of
CUFTA is that it restricts Canada's
ability to implement productivity-
boosting policies in these and re-
lated spheres. Why? First, because
US interests regard many of these
policies as "unfair" trade practices,
and CUFTA does not provide
Canada with effective protection
against US countervailing duties.
Second, CUFTA makes Canada
more vulnerable to ongoing US
pressure to "Americanize" Cana-
dian public policies-i.e., to de-
crease government intervention in
the economy by reducing support
for regional development, social
welfare, and other programs.
Canada's failure to register pro-
ductivity gains is consistent with
organized labor's vehement opposi-
tion to CUFTA. Canadian labor ar-
gues that CUFTA encourages the
export of jobs to the US and other
countries, especially from labor-
intensive, low-skill domestic in-
dustries. This prediction is being
fulfilled. Defenders of CUFTA re-
spond by claiming that the restruc-
turing of Canada's economy would
have occurred in any case, due to
the transformation of the world
economy. The truth probably lies
somewhere in between: CUFTA
has not caused, but it certainly has
accelerated, the demise of "sunset"
industries.
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Either way, the social cost is
high. CUFIA's supporters envi-
sioned that workers displaced
from sunset industries would be
retrained and shifted to jobs in
export-oriented "sunrise" indus-
tries. So far, however, most of the
workers who lose industrial jobs
are not finding new ones: employ-
ment in Canadian manufacturing
has dropped by about 10% during
the two years of CUFTA's imple-
mentation.
In this context, CUFTA liberal-
ized not only trade but also the
flow of investment. The Canadian
objective was to encourage foreign
direct investment and job creation
in leading edge export-oriented sec-
tors, whose growth would involve
advanced technology as well as re-
search and development opera-
tions.
Yet the flow of foreign direct
investment seems to be aimed
much less at the creation of new
productive capacity than at the
takeover and transformation of
existing Canadian-owned firms
into subsidiaries of transnational
corporations. Further, many of
these subsidiaries are cutting jobs,
costs, and production, while in-
creasing their volume of imports.
As yet there is no discernible trend
toward opening new plants, im-
plementing new lines of produc-
tion, or enhancing technological
capacity.
With some degree of validity,
proponents of CUFTA blame this
state of affairs on the economic re-
cession. Still, today's decision to in-
stall a new manufacturing plant in,
say, Tijuana or Buffalo instead of
Canada, cannot easily be reversed
in the future. What is more, many
of the plant closings in Canada are
permanent; they will not reopen
when the economy rebounds.
How Will Mexico Fare?
Mexico's economy is far less devel-
oped than Canada's. Hence, cau-
tion must be exercised in making
comparisons. Nevertheless, Mexi-
cans have much to learn from the
Canadian experience when it
comes to trilateral free-trade
negotiations.
Can Mexico expect to gain
secure access to the US market?
The Canadian lesson for Mexico is
clear: gradual tariff elimination will
contribute to secure market access,
but it won't achieve that goal by it-
self. The majority of Mexican ex-
ports to the US already benefit
from low tariffs. The main issue,
then, is nontariff barriers. Regard-
ing such barriers, Mexico is un-
likely to obtain any more than
Canada did in key areas like gov-
ernment procurement, trade rem-
edy laws, and relief from future US
protectionism.
Boosting productivity is vital to
Mexico's future. According to the
Canadian case, however, trade lib-
eralization and greater access to
the US market will not necessarily
raise productivity. The Canadian
experience stresses the importance
of implementing policies to im-
prove Mexico's "human capital"-
such as education, job training,
public health, and workers' rights-
as well as to develop its economic
infrastructure in general. As with
Canada, a free-trade agreement
could seriously narrow Mexico's lee-
way to carry out such policies.
The maquiladora industry
demonstrates that the flow of for-
eign capital into Mexico can foster
the development of physical plants
and facilities, and the creation of
new jobs. Unfortunately the indus-
try also demonstrates that the pros-
pects are grim for investment in
human capital-an indispensable
aspect of economic development.
The evidence includes the sector's
record of generally poor employ-
ment conditions and environmen-
tal performance, along with the
government's hands-off attitude on
issues of education, health, and so-
cial welfare.
Given major differences in the
labor markets of Canada and Mex-
ico, the latter's deepened integra-
tion with the North American
economy will probably result in
more jobs for its population, rather
than fewer jobs as in Canada. The
major differences are Mexico's
huge and cheap labor force; ab-
sence of independent labor
unions; and lax enforcement of
regulations in the areas of occupa-
tional safety, work benefits, and the
environment.
These differences give Mexico a
clear advantage in attracting capi-
tal and creating jobs in low-technol-
ogy, low-skill activities. Yet they also
provide national and international
incentives to maintain an economy
based on cheap labor and condu-
cive to a depressed domestic mar-
ket, low labor productivity, a large
informal economy, and environ-
mental degradation. Such an econ-
omy imposes serious constraints on
long-term economic development
and living standards. In addition,
assembly production activities like
in the maquiladora are internation-
ally mobile: they can be transferred
to other countries with relative
ease when conditions change.
This vulnerability coincides with
the inadequacy of Mexico's ability
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to finance productive investment.
The reasons are well-known: the
inability of low-income Mexicans
to save; the propensity of wealthy
Mexicans to buy foreign-made lux-
ury items and send their savings
abroad; and the onerous weight of
the debt crisis. The Salinas admin-
istration hopes to fill this resource
gap by enticing foreign and expa-
triated domestic capital through
policy deregulation, inexpensive
labor, and secure access to the
broader North American market.
Unfortunately, as the Canadian
situation indicates, the policy of
liberalizing capital mobility and for-
eign direct investment is a double-
edged sword. It can augment the
incoming flow of capital, but it can
also promote macroeconomic insta-
bility and reinforce subservience to
the decisions made by transna-
tional corporations. There is no
guarantee, moreover, that the aug-
mented flow of capital will be large
enough to offset Mexico's debt-
based resource drain.
Looking Inward
Given their differing levels of eco-
nomic development, the domestic
consequences of a free-trade agree-
ment in Mexico will not simply
mirror those of Canada. Yet, in
speculating on Mexico's economic
future, there is enough in common
to justify some form of comparison.
Mexico's policymakers and citizens
thus have good reason to look at
Canada's economic performance
since the implementation of its
free-trade agreement with the US.
From the Canadian perspective,
Mexico's quest for economic com-
petitiveness through cheap pro-
duction costs and free-trade
arrangements with its neighbors to
the north is likely to generate new
jobs for Mexicans. It is unlikely,
however, that the strategy will sig-
nificantly boost Mexico's productiv-
ity and living standards during the
1990s. Potentially more beneficial
would be greater emphasis on
strengthening Mexico's economic
and social infrastructure. *
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WSpace-Age Business Consulting
by Germdn Garrido
The Borderless World: Power
and Strategy in the Interlinked
Economy
by Kenichi Ohmae. New York: Harper
Business, 1990. 223 pp. $21.95.What strategy should
guide Latin Ameri-
can firms in a
global economy?
According to re-
nowned Japanese
business writer and consultant
Kenichi Ohmae, the answers lie in
Japan's brand of state policy and
transnational corporate manage-
ment, or rather, in his interpreta-
tion ofJapan's brand of state policy
and transnational management. Ar-
guably that interpretation revolves
around a premise of virtual hege-
mony in the global marketplace
that distorts the historical record of
the economic ascent ofJapan and
the "Asian Tigers." From the stand-
point of the overwhelming majority
of Latin American business manag-
ers, it also relegates the bulk of his
recommendations to the realm of
space-age fantasy.
Towards Global Enterprises
In The Borderless World, Ohmae pro-
poses that "global cities"-such as
Tokyo, New York, and London-
are at the core of the world market-
place of the late 20th century. They
have achieved this status by man-
aging the transnational flows of
Germdn Garrido is an executive with
Sintesis Quimica S.A., in Peru, and a
member of the board of Sintesis Farmo-
quimica Colombiana E.M.A., in Co-
lombia. He has master's degrees in
economics and political science from
the University of Pittsburgh.
capital, goods, and services, which,
according to Ohmae, are growing
as large corporations strive to offset
rising fixed costs by tapping wider
markets. As an example of the geo-
graphic complexity of such flows,
when a consumer in, say, Kansas
City, USA, or Kingston,Jamaica,
purchases a Nissan Sentra, he or
she is not-strictly speaking-ac-
quiring a Japanese auto. Although
the broadest processes of invest-
ment, production, and marketing
are orchestrated from Japan, the-
auto was probably manufactured in
the new Nissan plant in the US
with US labor and with parts pro-
duced in Mexico and other coun-
tries. Moreover, the advertising
campaign for the auto was likely
drawn up in New York and pro-
duced in Los Angeles, while trans-
portation to market and consumer
financing for the sale are likely to
have involved similarly far-flung
networks.
Such worldwide flows erode na-
tional frontiers. Ohmae observes
that as such they have rendered
unwieldy the notion of "home-
company subsidiary." In addition
they have given rise to a "mega-
economy" whose dynamics tran-
scend the macroeconomic policies
of individual countries.
In place of home-company
subsidiaries, firms must effectively
decentralize their operations, tailor-
ing them to fit the challenging di-
versity and fluidity of business
climates and consumer prefer-
ences around the world. Firms,
then, must develop the flexibility
not only to act as virtual natives in
their numerous geographic and
cultural centers of production and
sales, but also to anticipate chang-
ing conditions in these sites. Also
in the setting of a mega-economy,
government policymakers must rec-
ognize the obsolescence of nation-
ally grounded concepts such as
fiscal and trade deficit. For in-
stance, regarding balance-of-trade
measures, how should the export
of Toyotas from the US be classi-
fied: as a US or Japanese export?
Another World?
Ohmae emphatically and elo-
quently asserts that true wealth is
now based primarily on markets-
not on raw materials or fixed as-
sets. He suggests, therefore, that
poor countries can develop eco-
nomically only by integrating
themselves into the global mega-
economy. Thus, his implicit advice
to Latin American countries is to
eliminate their official barriers to
free trade, since doing so is the
only way Latin American consum-
ers can gain access to the best prod-
ucts and the lowest prices. He adds
that governments must withdraw
from the sphere of economic pro-
duction, while simultaneously edu-
cating their citizens to make wise
market choices.
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Ohmae's thinking is not only
simplistic but also contradictory,
particularly concerning the state's
role in national development.
Indeed, countries such as Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore have developed in-
dustrially through vigorous state
intervention. That is, their states
have taken substantial action to
protect infant industries from exter-
nal competition, construct the in-
frastructure for manufacturing
growth, and subsidize firms in myr-
iad other ways. Ohmae acknowl-
edges much of this by writing that
"When industries were weak, it
[the Japanese government] pro-
tected them" (p. 187).
Aside from those associated with
leading corporations in Brazil, Mex-
ico, and Argentina, Latin American
entrepreneurs tend to see the indis-
criminate opening of the region's
markets to global competition as
prejudicial to domestic firms. How
can they possibly compete against
the hegemonic corporations of the
US, Western Europe, and Asia? A
brief comparison with such corpo-
rations reveals the competitive
weakness of Latin American firms.
For example, Japan's top 20 compa-
nies account for 50% of its exports.
And its top 50 companies account
for 75% ofJapan's exports. Such
companies have enormous power
and reach. By contrast, Peru's top
20 companies account for 10.5%
of a dramatically smaller pool of
exports.
In sum, indiscriminately open-
ing Latin America's borders to
global competition would have
a sweeping result: the demise of
most of the region's domestic man-
ufacturing enterprises. They simply
would not hold their own against
the formidable resources at the
command of the world's leading
firms.
Nonetheless, Latin American
governments are now implement-
ing policies that decidedly favor
the interests of foreign enterprises.
Such policies coincide with the aus-
terity pressures that are pushing
the region's governments to en-
courage export development in
order to meet their external debt
obligations. But can export devel-
opment through foreign invest-
ment substantially strengthen the
economic infrastructure of most
Latin American countries, ena-
bling them to compete successfully
in the long run in the global mar-
ket? The major problem is that,
with the exception of Brazil, Mex-
ico, and Argentina, Latin American
economies lack the size and in-
frastructure to attract the type of
foreign investment that would gen-
erate wide-ranging development in
industry and complementary sec-
tors. It is far more likely that most
Latin American economies will not
only lose their domestic industrial
bases; they will find themselves
scrambling for economic crumbs
as mere labor-intensive export plat-
forms in the highly competitive
global arena.
Even if Latin American firms
were organizationally competitive
with their transnational counter-
parts, companies in countries such
as Colombia and Peru would be dis-
advantaged by higher fixed costs
arising from local instability. For in-
stance, Colombian and Peruvian
enterprises incur enormous costs
for the protection of their man-
agers and workers from terrorist
and narcotraffic violence. Surveys
of Peruvian enterprises show that
direct and indirect costs have risen
by 20-25% due to security expen-
ditures.
Not surprisingly, such concerns
do not appear in the pages of The
Borderless World. What Latin Ameri-
can realities call for is something
more creative and complex than
simply opening the gates to transna-
tional corporations. Rather, what
seems to be needed is a strategic
process of reorienting the produc-
tive structures of Latin American
countries to the exigencies of glob-
al competition. Such a process
would require carefully targeted
measures of government support
in order to foster balanced, self-
sustaining national and regional
development.
The dimensions and impli-
cations of Ohmae's analysis are
indeed fascinating. Yet, for most
Latin American entrepreneurs and
citizens, the content of The Border-
less World is about as far from real-
ity as a Steven Spielberg cinematic
fantasy. .
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Hemisphere Winter/Spring 1991 33
Hemispheric Trade Agreements
by Marian Goslinga
G eorge Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative proposes to create a free-trade bloc including not only
the US, Canada, and Mexico, but the Caribbean and Central and South America as well. The new union
would stretch from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, encompassing more territory and potentially more volume
than the European Community.
The groundwork for this grandiose proposal has already been partially accomplished. A free-trade agree-
ment was signed between Canada and the US in 1989, and serious trilateral negotiations will soon get under
way between Canada, Mexico, and the US. And the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative has been revised several times
since its inception.
Regional agreements are already in place in Central and South America and could be incorporated into a more ex-
tensive union. The Mercado Comzin Centroamericano, the Asociaci6n Latinoamericano de Integraci6n (ALADI, formerly the
Latin American Free Trade Association [LAFTA] ), the Sistema Econdmico Latinoamericano (SELA), the Pacto Andino, and
the Tratado de Integracidn, Cooperaci6n y Desarrollo (the 1986 treaty between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) are ready
for a larger framework linking North and South into an economic union.
The following is a list of recent publications on the subject that have appeared in the US and Latin America.
El acuerdo de libre comercio
entre Canada y Estados Unidos:
lecciones para America Latina.
Morris Miller. Integracidn Latino-
americana, v. 15, no. 153 (January/
February 1990), p. 24-34. [This
monthly periodical, published by
the Instituto para la Integraci6n de
Amrica Latina in Buenos Aires, is
an excellent source of information
on the process of integration in
Latin America. In addition to schol-
arly articles, it regularly features
data on regional agencies and
events of topical interest.]
Advancing the Goal of a Free
Trade Hemisphere. Kelly Bundy.
Global Trade, v. 110, no. 11 (Novem-
ber 1990), p. 32-34. [Discusses the
pending US-Mexico agreement as
well as the Enterprise for the Amer-
icas Initiative.]
ALADI 1980-1990: dificultades
para reorientar un proceso que
empez6 mal.Jaime Quijandria
Salm6n. Integraci6n Latinoameri-
cana, v. 15, no. 160 (September
1990), p. 29-37.
La armonizaci6n de politicas
econ6micas en el futuro de ALADI.
Marcelo Halperin. Integraci6n
Latinoamericana, v. 15, no. 160
(September 1990), p. 49-57.
Aspectos politicos de la integraci6n
latinoamericana. Osvaldo Hurtado.
Integraci6n Latinoamericana, v. 15,
no. 153 (January/February 1990),
p. 3-8.
Canadian-American Trade and
Investment under the Free Trade
Agreement. Harold Crookell. Quo-
rum Books, 1990. 218 p. $42.95.
Caribbean Basin Initiative [Revi-
sions]. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, v. 48 (August 18, 1990),
p. 2687-89. [A good source of infor-
mation for treaties/agreements in-
volving the US.]
CARICOM Countries and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Winston
H. Griffith. Latin American Perspec-
tives, v. 17 (Winter 1990), p. 33-54.
CARICOM Countries and Appro-
priate Technology. Winston H. Grif-
fith. World Development, v. 18 (June
1990), p. 845-58.
A Case Study of Effects of Devel-
oping Country Integration on
Trade Flows: The Andean Pact.
K. Khazeh, D. P. Clark. Journal of
Latin American Studies, v. 22 (May
1990), p. 317-30.
CBI, Other Matters in Conference
[Customs and Trade Act of 1990].
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
v. 48 (May 19, 1990), p. 1541.
Colonizing Canada: A Year and a
Half of Free Trade. Randy Robin-
son. Multinational Monitor, v. 11
(May 1990), p. 10-13.
La cooperaci6n tecnica interna-
cional para el comercio exterior
en America Latina y el Caribe.
Joaquin Izctie. Integraci6n Latino-
americana, v. 15, no. 157 (June
1990), p. 19-34. [Describes the
activities and programs of interna-
tional and/or regional agencies in
the area.]
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can and Caribbean librarian at Florida
International University.
La creaci6n del Instituto para la
Integraci6n de America Latina
(INTAL). Gustavo Lagos. Integra-
ci6n Latinoamericana, v. 15, no. 159
(August 1990), p. 5-8. [The author
has been director of INTAL since
its creation in 1969.]
Diez aixos de ALADI: lecciones y
perspectivas. Rubens Antonio Bar-
bosa. Integraci6n Latinoamericana,
v. 15, no. 160 (September 1990),
p. 24-28.
Europa y America Latina: rela-
ciones entre bloques comerciales
en el decenio de 1990. Alfredo
Fuentes Hernindez, Maria Clara
Rueda. Integraci6n Latinoamericana,
.v. 15, no. 161-62 (October/Novem-
ber 1990), p. 3-20. [Analysis of
trade flows between the European
Community and the Asociaci6n
Latinoamericana de Integraci6n. ]
The Evolution of Canada as an
Actor in Inter-American Affairs.
James Rochlin. Millennium, v. 19
(Summer 1990), p. 229-48.
An Examination of the Free Trade
Agreement between the United
States and Canada. Satish Chandra.
Tennessee's Business, v. 1 (Spring
1990), p. 15-19.
La experiencia de Europa 1992 y
su influencia en America Latina.
Mario Alejandro Weitz. Integracidn
Latinoamericana, v. 15, no. 155
(April 1990), p. 31-43. [Consider-
ing the success of the European
Community, the author urges the
speedy economic integration of
Latin America.]
Exploring the Dimensions of an
International Social Issues Climate.
J. E. McCann, L. G6mez-Mejia.
Human Relations, v. 43 (Fall 1990),
p. 141-67. [About the Caribbean
Basin Initiative.]
Finance Panel Backs Extension of
Caribbean Import Rules. R. D. Elv-
ing. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re-
port, v. 48 (March 3, 1990), p. 649.
Free Trade, Canada and the
European Challenge. Mihir Bose.
Accountancy (UK), v. 106, no. 1166
(October 1990), p. 101-2. [Com-
pares the US-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement with the European
Common Market.]
The Impact of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act on Carib-
bean Nations' Exports and Develop-
ment.J. Pelzman, G. K. Schoepfle.
Economic Development and Cultural
Change, v. 38 (July 1990), p. 845-54.
[Update and discussion of the origi-
nal article, which was published in
v. 36 (July 1988), p. 753-96.]
INTAL: objetivos, actividades,
evoluci6n y contribuci6n al proce-
so de integraci6n latinoamericana
en el periodo 1965-1975. Jose
Maria Aragiio. Integraci6n Latino-
americana, v. 15, no. 159 (August
1990), p. 23-35.
La integraci6n como via para reacti-
var la economia latinoamericana.
Felipe Pazos. Integraci6n Latino-
americana, v. 15, no. 153 (January/
February 1990), p. 9-14.
La integraci6n latinoamericana en
el decenio de 1990: tiene anm
sentido? Felix Pefia. Integraci6n
Latinoamericana, v. 15, no. 159
(August 1990), p. 36-40.
The Investment Provisions of the
Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement: A Canadian Perspec-
tive.Jean Raby. American Journal
of International Law, v. 84 (April
1990), p. 394-443. [The author ar-
gues that the terms are favorable to
Canadian interests.]
The Mexican Free-Trade Illusion:
A U.S.-Mexico Trade Agreement
Does Not Presage a Unified Mar-
ket like the EC-And It May Not
Even Lead to Free Trade. Jeffrey
Schott. InternationalEconomy, v. 4
(June-July 1990), p. 32-34.
Mexico as a Trading Partner. F.J.
Macchiarola. Proceedings of the Acad-
emy of Political Science, v. 37, no. 4
(1990), p. 90-109. [Background arti-
cle to the current negotiations.]
Mexico: desafios de la integraci6n
econ6mica (oportunidades al
Norte, compromisos al Sur). Jesuis
Puente Leyva. Integraci6n Latino-
americana, v. 15, no. 161-62 (Octo-
ber/November 1990), p. 66-71.
Multinationals and Canada-United
States Free Trade. Alan M. Rug-
man. University of South Carolina
Press, 1990. 193 p. $29.95.
A New Retail Frontier? Last Year's
Free Trade Agreement with Cana-
da May Present New Opportunities
Up North for American Retailers
and Vendors. Discount Merchandiser,
v. 30 (January 1990), p. 27-30.
North-America Trade Pact: A Good
Idea? The U.S.-Canada Free-Trade
Pact, Which Took Effect Early This
Year, May Serve as a Model for
Future Bilateral Pacts with Mexico,
the Caribbean and Central Amer-
ica. Patrick G. Marshall. Editorial
Research Reports (publishing arm of
the Congressional Quarterly in Wash-
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ington, DC), December 8, 1989,
p. 682-95.
Los paises de menor desarrollo
econ6mico relativo en los progra-
mas de integraci6n de America
Latina. UNEconomic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Santiago: CEPAL, 1990.
Primer decenio de la ALADI:
principios e instituciones. Gustavo
Magarifios. Integraci6n Latinoameri-
cana, v. 15, no. 160 (September
1990), p. 10-23.
El proceso de integraci6n en
America Latina. Inter-American
Development Bank, Institute for Latin
American Integration. Buenos Aires:
BID/INTAL. [Annual publication.]
Propuesta institucional para la
Cuenca del Plata. Guillermo del
Bosco. Integracidn Latinoamericana,
v. 15, no. 161-62 (October/Novem-
ber 1990), p. 72-74. [About integra-
tion in the Southern Cone.]
Regional Trading Blocs: A Threat
to the Multilateral Trading System?
Committee for Development Planning.
New York: United Nations, 1990.
[UN publication ST/ESA/219.]
Relaciones entre la Comunidad
Econ6mica Europea y el Grupo
Andino. Roberto Junguito Bonnet.
Integraci6n Latinoamericana, v. 15,
no. 161-62 (October/November
1990), p. 33-37.
Road to Mexico Will Be Long.
John S. McClenahan. Industry Week,
v. 239, no. 14 (July 16, 1990), p. 74.
[Discusses the difficulties to be
surmounted before a trade agree-
ment can be signed.]
SELA: sector de servicios en las
negociaciones multilaterales.
Integracidn Latinoamericana, v. 14,
no. 151 (November 1989), p. 45-46.
Senate Backs Caribbean Bill,
Declines to Broaden Scope. R. D.
Elving. Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, v. 48 (April 28, 1990),
p. 1248-50.
The Single European Act: A
CARICOM Perspective. S. Basdeo.
Journal of lnteramerican Studies and
World Affairs, v. 32 (Summer 1990),
p. 103-20.
Taking the Initiative: The "Enter-
prise for the Americas" Proposal.
John Wade. Business Venezuela (Sep-
tember/October 1990), p. 14-15.
[Comments on Latin American re-
actions to President Bush'sJune
1990 proposal.]
Trade Liberalization and Competi-
tive Behavior: A Note Assessing the
Evidence and the Public Policy Im-
plications. S. Globerman. Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, v. 9
(Winter 1990), p. 157-89. [About
the US-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment.]
Trade Policy in the 1990's: Good-
bye Bipolarity, Hello Regions.
L. Krause. World Today, v. 46 (May
1990), p. 83-84. [Emphasizes the
importance of regional blocs in
world trade.]
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Success
Gives Impetus to Mexico Talks.
Alan R. Taylor. Financier, v. 14,
no. 7 (July 1990), p. 26-28.
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment Means Greater Mutual Pros-
perity: Frequently Asked Questions
about the Free Trade Agreement.
Ingrid Mohn. Business America,
v. 111, no. 19 (October 6, 1990),
p. 3-6.
The United States Government's
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Wilfred
Whittingham. CEPAL Review (De-
cember 1989), p. 73-92. [Reviews
the CBI's achievements in the light
of the objectives and expectations.]
The United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement. R. McCulloch.
Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science, v. 37, no. 4 (1990), p. 78-80.
White House Fact Sheet on the "En-
terprise for the Americas Initiative
Act" of 1990, September 14, 1990.
Weekly Compilation of PresidentialDoc-
uments (US), v. 26 (September 17,
19 9 0), p. 1372-76.
Thefirt tachrs'guie t exlor LainAmrc an
the Caiba fro a globa perspetiv
Latin America and the Caribbean
from a Global Perspective
A Resource Guide for Teachers
Pedro R. Bermudez and Barbara C. Cruz
This ten-part resource guide is a self-contained series of lessons on Latin
America and the Caribbean based on the Hanvey model of global aware-
ness. The lessons focus upon economic development, human rights,
immigration issues, the role of women, and environmental concerns.
Price: $21.00
To order, please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University
Park, Miami, FL 33199. (305) 348-2894; FAX (305) 348-3593.
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